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"KIDDIE CRIME"? THE UTILITY OF
CRIMINAL LAW IN CONTROLLING
CYBERBULLYING
SUSAN W. BRENNER* & MEGAN REHBERG**
INTRODUCTION
It is a scary thought that someone could go to jail for posting a com-
ment on the Internet. If so, we could not build jails fast enough.1
Cyberbullying is a growing problem in the United States
and elsewhere. It presents schools with what is at once an old and a
new problem: Much of cyberbullying consists of activity that has
been common in schools for decades, probably for centuries (e.g.,
spreading gossip and rumors, or harassing other students). What is
unique about cyberbullying is that students can use cyberspace to
broadcast gossip and rumors to a much wider audience and take
harassment to new levels.
Since cyberbullying-unlike its antecedent-is not confined
to school premises, some suggest it is a phenomenon the law needs
to address. Some, in fact, go so far as to suggest that criminal law
should be used to deter cyberbullying. That is the issue we address
in this article. In Part I, we define cyberbullying, which provides
the empirical foundation for the analysis in subsequent sections. In
Part II, we examine the viability, and permissibility, of using estab-
lished criminal law to control cyberbullying. In Part III, we con-
*NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and Technology, University of Dayton
School of Law.
**J.D., University of Dayton School of Law (2009).
1. State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (Painter, J.,
concurring); See infra Part II.A.2.b for an examination of the Ellison decision.
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sider whether new criminal law can, or should, be used to control
the residual category of cyberbullying activity that cannot be ad-
dressed under existing criminal law.
Before we proceed, we should explain why our title includes
the phrase "kiddie crime." In using the phrase, we by no means in-
tend to minimize the "harm" caused by cyberbullying or the prob-
lems it creates for educational institutions. We use it as a term of
art-a collective noun encompassing the varieties of cyberbullying
that are not considered criminal under existing law. We examine
these issues in Parts II and III.
I. CYBERBULLYING: A DEFINITION AND A TAXONOMY
Cyberbullying has garnered a variety of definitions as it has
gained notoriety. Since the definitions in common use tend to be
imprecise, our first task is to define the phenomenon we intend to
analyze. The primary problem we see with many of the current de
facto definitions is that they do not differentiate between bullying
in an educational context and bullying in a general societal context.2
It is necessary to distinguish adult-on-adult bullying from what has
traditionally been considered bullying, i.e., student-on-student ag-
gression that occurs in an educational context.3 This is essential be-
cause much of what constitutes adult bullying-and certainly the
more serious types of adult bullying-can be addressed with exist-
ing criminal law.4
For our purposes, therefore, we use a definition of cyberbul-
lying that encompasses only that conduct which occurs in an educa-
tional context. We define cyberbullying as the repeated use of
computer or other modern communications technology to engage
2. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Man Receives Compensation for Cyberbullying,
WIRED, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatleve/2008/12/british-man-
rec/ (reporting a bullying incident in a societal context).
3. See generally PETER RANDALL, BULLYING IN ADULTHOOD 7-31 (2001)
(providing an overview of adult bullying); BULLYING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS:
A SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 1-
5 (Dorothy L. Espelage & Susan M. Swearer eds., 2004) (providing a social-
ecological framework of bullying among children).
4. See discussion infra Part III.
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in non-physical abuse of one or more individuals when the actors
are all constituents of a common educational context. Two parts of
this definition are significant. The first is the requirement that the
contact be repeated; the second is that the conduct takes place
within an educational context.
What do we mean by "educational context"? Does it only
encompass students who have not yet attained a high school di-
ploma? Or should it also encompass college, university, graduate,
and even trade-school students? We could exclude the latter cate-
gories because of the premise noted earlier: that cyberbullying
should be distinguished from simple adult-on-adult aggression. But
while there are important empirical differences between K-12 stu-
dents and adults who attend post-secondary educational institu-
tions, every educational context can generate the dynamics that
give rise to bullying and cyberbullying.5 We therefore do not limit
the educational context element of our definition to the K-12 sec-
tor; our definition encompasses cyberbullying in any educational
institution, regardless of the age of those who attend. Our limita-
tion of the education sector, however, distinguishes our definition
from others that require, for example, only "willful and repeated
harm.",6 Our definition allows us to consider the possibility that
traditional criminal law-which is generally adequate to deal with
generic adult-on-adult cyberbullying-may not be adequate when
the cyberbullying involves adults who are also students.
Simply defining cyberbullying is not enough. While our
definition captures the distinctive elements of cyberbullying, it also
assumes a unitary phenomenon. That is, like all definitions, it as-
sumes that cyberbullying involves a single dynamic: bully and vic-
tim. That assumption is a common feature of substantive criminal
law. Murder, for example, involves the reciprocal roles of murderer
and victim, robbery involves the reciprocal roles of robber and vic-
tim, and so on. It also involves a power imbalance: in traditional
5. See, e.g., Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L.
REV. 51, 63-66 (2005) (addressing cyberbullying in higher education and in law
schools).
6. SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE
SCHOOLYARD 5 (2009).
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crimes, the perpetrator has some advantage-greater strength, a
weapon, information that can be used to blackmail someone-that
gives him the ability to harm the victim.
Real-world bullying and cyberbullying also involve a power
imbalance between bully and victim, 7 but the imbalance is more
nuanced because cyberbullying, unlike its real-world counterpart, is
predicated upon the infliction of non-physical harm. The reliance
on non-physical harm alters the power imbalance between bully
and victim because the participants in an educational institution
have different roles (teacher and student), and these roles usually
determine the respective power positions of the participants in a
given cyberbullying dynamic. When a cyberbully targets another
student, the power imbalance between the two is likely to be indis-
tinguishable from the imbalance between a real-world bully and his
hapless victim; but when a cyberbully targets a teacher, the power
imbalance is likely to be less uneven given the teacher's position in
the educational institution.
Differences in the power imbalance in the cyberbullying dy-
namic are an important factor in assessing the propriety of using
criminal law to deal with cyberbullying. We therefore developed a
taxonomy of cyberbullying that captures the nuanced power imbal-
ances that can occur in this phenomenon: student-on-student cy-
berbullying; student-on-teacher cyberbullying; teacher-on-student
cyberbullying; and teacher-on-teacher cyberbullying. We examine
each category below.
A. Taxonomy
This section reviews instances of cyberbullying that fall into
each of the categories in our taxonomy. Part I.B addresses another
relevant distinction: private versus public cyberbullying. We will
return to the issues addressed in these sections in Part III, when we
assess the utility and propriety of using criminal law to deal with the
problem of cyberbullying.
7. See KEN RIGBY, NEW PERSPEcTIVES ON BULLYING 32 (2002).
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1.Student-on-Student
There are two high-profile examples of student-on-student
cyberbullying. One case involved eight teens in Florida who physi-
cally assaulted another student and videotaped the incident, posting
it on YouTube. The students apparently wanted to gain notoriety
and fame from the video, which became popular enough to obtain
the attention of The New York Times.' The beating, which went on
for about a half hour, left the victim with a concussion and two
black eyes, and the video went viral on the Internet. The police be-
lieved that the beating was the result of comments that the victim,
Victoria Lindsay, had been posting on MySpace. 9 This case is an
interesting hybrid between cyberbullying, where the harassment
takes place online, and traditional bullying, where the harm from
the bully is physical in nature.
Another interesting cyberbullying case from New York in-
volved a middle school blogger who dubbed herself "Miss In the
Know" (also known as Miss ITK) and blogged about her classmates
on the Upper East Side of Manhattan.1" The student's blog was
based heavily on the premise of the popular television show "Gos-
sip Girl," in which an unknown resident of the Upper East Side
blogs about wealthy high school students. The blog's writing style
was sharp enough to merit comments from New York Magazine's
Daily Intel blog11 and The New York Sun, but students and parents
were less than thrilled.
One post read: "He fell so fast, even seventh graders won't
hook up with him. Now that's GOTTA hurt. Dear Tommy, rip up
those tickets to the top, because you're headed on a one-way trip to
the B-list. Love, ITK."12 When school officials received complaints
8. Damien Cave, Eight Teenagers Charged in Internet Beatings Have
Their Day on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at All.
9. Id.
10. Elizabeth Green, Tears, Glee Greet a 'Gossip Girl' Copycat, NEW
YORK SUN, May 22, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/new-york/tears-glee-greet-a-
gossip-girl-copycat/76895/.
11. Daily Intel Blog, http:l/nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/O5/real-life_
gossip-girl-roils th.html#hp (May 22, 2008, 12:00 EST).
12. Green, supra note 10.
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about the blog, it was shut down, although there were no reports of
how this occurred. It was so beloved by some students that a group
commemorating it was created on Facebook."3
In this case, while the activity falls under the repeated con-
text we require in our definition, it is worthwhile to note that this
blog was not targeting one particular student but was critical of
many. As a result, under some definitions this could not be con-
strued to be cyberbullying because it lacks the necessary repeated
attacks on one particular subject. This case is noteworthy, however,
because of its connection to popular culture.
We noticed a general absence of examples of student-on-
student cyberbullying-primarily, we think, because students (and
their parents) are reluctant to pursue litigation, and so the incidents
are handled privately, either by schools, parents, or students them-
selves. Student-on-student cyberbullying also has a large contin-
gent of examples that fall into the "private" category, so many cases
simply do not move beyond the bully and the victim. Student-on-
teacher cyberbullying cases are, however, not as difficult to come
by.
2.Student-on-Teacher
Student-on-teacher cyberbullying can occur in many ways.
In a Pennsylvania case, for example, a student created a website
from his home on which he posted derogatory and threatening
comments and drawings about his principal and his math teacher. 14
The website was entitled "Teacher Sux" and contained a number of
pages, including one that discussed, in vulgar terms, a fabricated
sexual relationship between the principal and a principal at another
school, as well as a page attacking the student's math teacher, Mrs.
Fulmer, entitled "Why Fulmer Should be Fired." 15 The most nota-
13. R.I.P - In the Know 2012, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?
gid=18673786321 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
14. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847., 848 (Pa. 2002).
15. Id. at 851. The "Why Fulmer Should be Fired" page argued, using
"degrading terms, that because of her physique and her disposition, Mrs.
Fulmer should be terminated from her employment.... Finally, along with
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ble page, however, was titled "Why Should She Die?" and re-
quested funds from the reader to hire a hit man." This was fol-
lowed by 136 repetitions of defamatory language, and a picture of a
decapitated Mrs. Fulmer with blood dripping from her neck. 7 On
the first page of the website, the student also included a disclaimer
that stated that "by clicking," the visitor agreed that he would not
tell any employees of the school district about the site, that the visi-
tor was not a member of the staff, and that the visitor would not
disclose the identity of the site's creator. 18
Eventually, the principal discovered the existence of the site
and, believing the threats to be serious, called the police and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Both authorities declined to file
charges. The teacher was informed of the site and also took the
threats seriously, and was granted medical leave for a full school
year due to her inability to return to teaching. 1" The student was
eventually given a three-day suspension, which was extended to ten
days, with the school ultimately opting to expel the student.'z The
student and his parents sued, claiming that this was a violation of
the student's free-speech rights. 2' The court ultimately held that
schools can restrict off-campus online speech that threatens a per-
son's safety when they can demonstrate harm to the victim, and
that, in this case, the website "created an actual and substantial in-
terference with the work of the school., 22 This case is a prime ex-
the criticism of Mrs. Fulmer, a web page provided answers for certain math
lessons." Id.
16. Id. The "Why Should She Die?" page asked readers to "'Take a look
at the diagram and the reasons I gave, then give me $20 to help pay for the
hitman."' Id. The diagram "consisted of a photograph of Mrs. Fulmer with..
. physical attributes highlighted to attract the viewers' attention.... Another
page set forth a diminutive drawing of Mrs. Fulmer with her head cut off and
blood dripping from her neck." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 852 (the teacher developed anxiety and depression; as a result.,
she could not return to work for the remainder of the school year and was
granted a medical leave the following year).
20. Id. at 852-53.
21. Id. at 853.
22. Id. at 869.
20091 "KIDDIE CRIME"
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
ample of cyberbullying being properly handled by the school.
While the police and the FBI were called, neither decided that
charges were appropriate in this situation, and they left the district
to deal with reprimanding the student.
In another student-created website case, Justin Layshock
created a false MySpace page of his high school principal, Eric
Trosch.23 This fake profile ridiculed Trosch's weight and sexuality,
mentioned steroids and alcohol, and contained a photograph of
24Trosch copied from the school's website. Justin created the false
profile at his grandmother's home, during non-school hours.2' This
page was online for approximately six days before Layshock tried
to remove it himself.26 Layshock received a ten day out-of-school
suspension, but the court ruled that his First Amendment rights
were violated because there was no material and substantial disrup-
tion, and that while the profile may have been lewd, it was not ob-
scene and the conduct occurred off school property.27
28Similarly, in A.B. v. State, a student's writing on a
MySpace page purported to be her principal's was considered pro-
tected political speech. 29 A.B., knowing the profile was false and
had not been made by her principal, made six derogatory and ob-
scene postings, including "die .. .gobert . . .die.",30 The State of
Indiana filed charges and A.B. was adjudicated to be delinquent.
She was placed on probation for nine months. The Supreme Court
of Indiana ultimately ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
support A.B.'s harassment conviction.31
In another MySpace case, Alex Davis, a fifteen-year-old
student, posted a comment on a MySpace page of his teacher,




26. Id. at 591-92.
27. Id. at 601, 603.
28. 863 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) rev'd on other grounds, 885
N.E.2d 1223 (2008).
29. Id. at 1218.
30. Id. at 1214.
31. A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (Ind. 2008).
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Robert Muzzillo. The profile mentioned an appreciation of Mi-
chael Jackson and liking to have a "gay old time.,1 2 Davis claimed
he only wrote that Muzzillo lost an eye while wrestling with alliga-
tors and midgets.33 The teacher was so offended that he filed defa-
mation charges against Davis.34 The Georgia court dismissed them
as unconstitutional.35
In a Connecticut case, a high school student was barred
from running in a senior class election after she criticized adminis-
trators on her blog for their handling of a student music festival3 6
Avery Doninger blamed "douchebags in central office" for the
purported cancellation and asked students to complain to the
school superintendent. 7 In response to the blog, the school prohib-
ited Doninger from running for class secretary in her senior year.
Doninger filed suit, claiming that her First Amendment rights had
been violated.'
The court held that the prohibition of Doninger from run-
ning from office was proper, because her posting "foreseeably cre-
ated a risk of substantial disruption within the school environ-
ment."39 The court held that the language used in her blog was
plainly offensive, potentially disruptive, misleading, or potentially
false, and that her behavior could have affected the governing of
the student council as a result.4 °




35. Ken Rodriguez, Lewd Web Posting about Principal Leads to Lawsuit,
School Options, EXPRESS-NEWS (San Antonio), Sept. 21, 2006,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/MYSA092206 03ARodriguez-2eb29de_
html3637.html.
36. Alex Johnson, Rules to Curb Online Bullying Raise Concerns,
MSNBC.coM, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28629118/.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008).
40. Id. at 50-52.
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In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,41 two eighth grade
students created a MySpace page of their principal, Mr. McGonigle.
The page did not identify the principal by name, but did identify
him as a principal and included a picture taken from the school
website.4' The MySpace page depicted the principal as a pedophile
and a sex addict whose interests included "hitting on students and
their parents., 43 The school determined that the students violated
the discipline code, which prohibits false accusations against staff
members, and that the students also violated the computer use pol-
icy when they took a copyrighted picture from the school website.
44
45The students received ten-day out-of-school suspensions.
J.S. sued the school district, claiming a violation of First
Amendment rights and arguing that the school could not punish her
for out-of-school speech that did not cause a substantial disrup-
tion.46 The judge disagreed, however, holding that the school could
discipline for lewd and vulgar off-campus speech that had an effect
47on campus.
In an interesting turn of events, a vice-principal in Texas
sued the students who created a false MySpace page, as well as
their parents, alleging negligent supervision. The vice-principal's
lawyer described the page as "four pages of filth" that "rose to a
level which was so unbelievably vile, the only thing we could do is
what we did., 48 The website included her picture, pulled from the
school website, her place of employment, lewd comments suggest-
ing she was a lesbian, and images of sexual devices. 49 Vice-Principal
Anna Draker sued Benjamin Schreiber and Ryan Todd for defama-
tion and libel per se, and their parents for negligence and gross neg-
ligence relating to the parents' supervision of their children's use of
41. No. 3:07CV585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11,
2008).
42. Id. at *2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *6.
46. Id. at *7.
47. Id. at *17-18.
48. Rodriguez, supra note 35.
49. Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex. App. 2008).
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the Internet. 50 The court granted the students' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Draker's claims against the students for
defamation and libel per se.5 Her claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was also dismissed in summary judgment, and
the court found that the claims against the parents were dependent
upon liability findings against the minors, resulting in a dismissal of
all claims.52
53In Requa v. Kent School District No. 415, a student cov-
ertly recorded a teacher in class and posted the video on YouTube,
and several students linked the video to their MySpace pages. Re-
qua was allegedly not the student who videotaped the teacher, but
was named by another student as someone who was involved with
the project.54 The video criticized the hygiene of teacher Joyce
Mong and poked fun at her weight and the clutter in her class-
room.55 The video was titled "Mongzilla" and called it a "Mong-
tage" of images. The video never surfaced at school, nor did any-
one at school become aware of the video until a local news station
started searching the Internet for students who had created You-
Tube videos criticizing their high school teachers."
The court found that the video, which also included a stu-
dent making "rabbit ears" and pelvic thrusts behind the teacher,
constituted a material and substantial disruption when it denied the
plaintiff's motion to enjoin the school district from enforcing a
57
forty-day suspension.
50. Id. at 321.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 324.
53. 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
54. Paul Shukovsky & Nina Akhmeteli, Free Speech vs. Class Disruption,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 2007, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/
316618_youtube22.html.
55. Id.
56. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
57. Id. at 1280.
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3.Teacher-on-Student
It is, perhaps understandably, difficult to find reported in-
stances in which a teacher cyberbullied one or more of his students.
One example of this type of cyberbullying involves the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools in Charlotte, North Carolina. Seven teachers
had social networking pages that were inappropriate. The superin-
tendent has recommended firing a teacher who wrote that her ac-
tivities included "teaching chitlins in the ghetto of Charlotte" and
"drinking." 58 Another teacher used a Facebook "mood box" to post
"I'm feeling p--ed because I hate my students!"59
While there are currently few, if any, cases that fall into this
category of our taxonomy, we included it for two reasons. First, it is
a logical alternative. Second, we believe this type of cyberbullying
will become more common as teachers increasingly use online re-
sources such as MySpace and Facebook to communicate with their
students. As perhaps we all know, online communication can gen-
erate a sense of intimacy that can induce adults, as well as children,
to engage in inappropriate behavior.
4.Teacher-on-Teacher
Cases involving conduct that was treated as teacher-on-
teacher cyberbullying are rare, probably for two reasons. First, cy-
berbullying is generally less common among adults than it is among
children. Second, when teacher-on-teacher cyberbullying occurs, it
is treated either as a situation involving employment law or as a
matter for criminal prosecution. The latter alternative is likely to
occur when the cyberbullying teacher's conduct rises to the level of
stalking, harassment, or defamation. 60 There is, though, a Pennsyl-
vania episode known as the "drunken pirate" case.
58. North Carolina Teachers Face Consequences for Facebook Posts




60. See infra Part II.
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Stacy Snyder was a student teacher at a local school who
was repeatedly reprimanded by her cooperating teacher for unpro-
fessional behavior, including discussing how a run-in with her ex-
husband while at dinner with her boyfriend ruined her Valentine's
Day.6' Snyder had been warned during orientation not to refer to
their students or cooperating teacher on social networking or per-
sonal web pages, but she chose to ignore the warning and posted a
critical remark about her cooperating teacher.62 She also posted a
picture entitled "drunken pirate" on an area of the website her stu-
dents could view. The picture depicted her wearing a pirate hat and
holding a plastic cup. 63 As a result of this picture, she was not al-
lowed to complete her student teaching placement, which resulted
in her graduating with a Bachelor of Arts in English instead of her
expected Bachelor of Science in Education degree.64
B. A Final Distinction: Public vs. Private Cyberbullying
In addition to the distinctions included in our taxonomy,
there are also differences in how cyberbullying is performed. It can
be "public" or "private."
We define public cyberbullying as involving any material
that is posted in a public forum: YouTube, MySpace, Facebook,
Twitter, blogs, or websites. This material can range from embar-
rassing pictures that the subject would rather not see posted, to
harassing quotes posted to a Facebook wall, to the cyberbully's own
social networking page. Also included in this definition would be
any instances of "private" cyberbullying spread to a large number
of people-e.g., a text sent to a large number of people, forwarding
a private e-mail to a group of friends, or posting a status message on
an instant messenger client such as Trillian or AOL Instant Mes-
senger.
61. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97943, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
62. Id. at *13.
63. Id. at *15.
64. Id.
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A prime example of "public" cyberbullying is the rise of
"sexting," the act of sending sexually charged material via cell
phone text messages.65 While raising a host of child pornography
issues, resulting in felonies for possession and dissemination of child
pornography in eleven states, sexting itself is not cyberbullying, as it
does not fit within our definition. The act moves into the realm of
cyberbullying when the "sexts" are sent to those other than the in-
tended recipients.
6
In a tragic example, Jesse Logan, an eighteen-year-old from
Cincinnati, Ohio, committed suicide after a nude picture she sent to
her boyfriend was forwarded to other classmates at her school.67
The cyberbullying then crossed into more traditional forms of bul-
lying as the classmates harassed her, calling her derogatory names
and ultimately making attending school so traumatic that she began
skipping school and ultimately hung herself in her closet.68
Private cyberbullying, on the other hand, tends to be be-
tween the cyberbully and the target. E-mails, instant messages, and
private messages on social networking sites all fall into this cate-
gory. This type of cyberbullying can cause just as much emotional
harm as public cyberbullying, as seen in the Megan Meier case from
69Missouri. While we will not discuss the case in detail here since
much information can be found elsewhere, the Meier case involved
private cyberbullying carried out via MySpace and AOL Instant
Messenger. That case ended just as tragically as the Logan case
mentioned above-Meier committed suicide in her closet after re-
65. Mike Celezic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over 'Sexting,'
MSNBC.coM, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030/.
66. Dahlia Lithwick, Textual Misconduct: What to do About Teens and
Their Dumb Naked Photos of Themselves, SLATE, Feb. 14, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2211169/.
67. See Celezic, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. Steve Pokin, 'My Space' Hoax Ends with Suicide of Dardenne Prairie





ceiving a private message that stated, "The world would be a better
place without you.
70
In the next section we examine the existing offenses that
could be applied to prosecute cyberbullies. In Part III, we consider
whether we need to create a new crime-a "kiddie crime"-to ad-
dress the residual conduct that cannot be prosecuted under current
law.
II. CRIMINAL LAW AND CYBERBULLYING
"Cyberbullying should be a crime" 71
As noted earlier, the frustration of dealing with cyberbully-
ing has led some educators to call for the use of criminal sanctions
against those who engage in such activity." In this section, we ana-
lyze the extent to which existing criminal offenses apply to cyber-
bullying; the sections below each examine an offense or offenses
that might apply to cyberbullying.73 Each section is divided into
two parts: The first outlines the elements of a particular offense (or,
in one instance, related offenses); the second analyzes the applica-
bility of the offense(s) to cyberbullying.
A. Stalking and harassment
Since most states do not have criminal cyberbullying laws,74
prosecutors who want to impose criminal liability on cyberbullies
70. Id.
71. Meagan Fitzpatrick, Cyberbullying Should Be A Crime, Teachers Say,
GAZETTE (Montreal), July 11, 2008, http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/
news/story.html?id=2b381545-bfd8-4fe8-9fc7-2a63ae3009d3&k=22707.
72. See id. ("Cyberbullying is becoming so prevalent in Canadian
schools[that a] teachers' group says it should be a punishable offence").
73. Since our concern is with cyberbullying, we do not consider offenses
such as assault, rape, arson, murder, which require conduct in the real world.
We are concerned only with crimes that can be committed online.
74. But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A(2) (2004) (criminalizing "stu-
dent harassment, intimidation or bullying," which are defined as conduct that
is "sufficiently severe, persistent or pervasive that it creates an intimidating,
threatening or abusive educational environment for a student").
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often rely on stalking and harassment statutes. In the first section
below, we explain how these statutes evolved and the conduct they
outlaw. In the next section we analyze their suitability for use
against cyberbullies.
1.The Crimes
Harassment is the older of these related crimes. The crimi-
nalization of harassment began about a century ago, when it be-
came apparent that telephones could be used for less-than-
legitimate reasons. The initial problem occurred when callers used
"vulgar, profane, obscene or indecent language., 75
Concerned about the "harm" being done to the women and
children who received such calls, states responded by adopting stat-
utes that created the crime of "telephone harassment. 7 6 While
telephone harassment tended to focus only on obscene or threaten-
ing phone calls, some states broadened their harassment statutes to
encompass more general conduct, such as "anonymous or repeated
telephone calls that are intended to harass or annoy., 77 This ap-
proach to harassment still survives in the basic harassment statutes
of many states.8
The basic harassment statutes in effect until the last decade
of the twentieth century generally failed to encompass more prob-
lematic conduct, such as touching someone, insulting them, or fol-
lowing them.79 That began to change in 1989, when actress Rebecca
75. See, e.g., Darnell v. State, 161 S.W. 971, 971 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913)
(affirming the conviction of a man for using vulgar, obscene, and indecent lan-
guage over the phone).
76. See id.; see also Andrea J. Robinson, Note, A Remedial Approach to
Harassment, 70 VA. L. REV. 507 (1984) (examining various forms of harass-
ment and subsequent remedies).
77. Robinson, supra note 76, at 524 (surveying telephone harassment
statutes then in effect).
78. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(b)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (com-
munications that "harass or cause alarm"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183(a)
(West 2007) ("harass, annoy or alarm" another); IND. CODE § 35-45-2-
2(a)(2004) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 2008) (same).
79. See supra note 78. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(2)-(5) (1980)
(encompassing behavior such as offensive touching and taunting).
Schaeffer was stalked and killed by an obsessive fan.80 Shocked by
the Schaeffer murder and five similar murders, California legisla-
tors passed the nation's first criminal stalking law in 1990." By
1993, forty-eight states had followed suit.82 In 1999, New York be-
came the final state to adopt a criminal stalking statute.83
Most of the state stalking statutes followed the California
model,' which essentially defines stalking as aggravated harass-
ment:
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and re-
peatedly follows or willfully and maliciously
harasses another person and who makes a
credible threat with the intent to place that per-
son in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or
the safety of his or her immediate family is
guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than
one year, or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine
and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the
state prison.85
The California stalking statute has two actus reus elements:
(i) repeatedly following or otherwise harassing the victim; and (ii) a
credible threat to the victim or victim's family. It defines "har-
ass[ment]" as engaging in a "course of conduct directed at a specific
80. See, e.g., Robert A. Guy, Jr., The Nature and Constitutionality of
Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L. REV. 991, 991 (1993) (analyzing the scope and
constitutionality of recently created stalking statutes, including the California
statute); see also E.A. Torriero, The Strange Ways of Slaying Suspect, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 21, 1989), 1989 WLNR 814458 (reporting the the
arrest and investigation of Schaeffer's stalker).
81. See Guy, supra note 80, at 992.
82. See Paul E. Mullen & Michele Path6, Stalking, 29 CRIME & JUST. 273,
275 (2002).
83. See Kimberly Wingteung Seto, How Should Legislation Deal with
Children as the Victims and Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?, 9 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 70 (2002).
84. See Guy, supra note 80, at 992.
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West 1999). California does not make
simple harassment a crime.
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person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the
person and that serves no legitimate purpose." 86 The statute de-
fines "credible threat" as a
verbal or written threat .... or a threat implied
by a pattern of conduct or a combination of
verbal, written, or electronically communicated
statements and conduct, made with the intent
to place the person that is the target of the
threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety or
the safety of his or her family, and made with
the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as
to cause the person who is the target of the
threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or
the safety of his or her family. 7
California's focus on "credible threat" as an element of
stalking led some to characterize stalking as an inchoate crime, on
the premise that the "harm" it addresses is the "murder, rape or
battery that the stalking . . . could ultimately produce.,8 1 Others
86. Id. § 646.9(e). Like other stalking and harassment statutes, the Cali-
fornia statute does not define "legitimate purpose." A Michigan court relied
on the plain meanings of "serve" and "legitimate" to conclude that "the
phrase 'conduct that serves a legitimate purpose' means conduct that contrib-
utes to a valid purpose that would otherwise be within the law irrespective of
the criminal stalking statute." Cavanaugh v. Smith, No. 282147, 2009 WL
1101379, at *5 (Mich. App. Apr. 23, 2009) (quoting Nastal v. Henderson &
Assoc. Investigations, Inc., 691 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Mich. 2005)). See also People v.
Pidhajecky, No. 2007NY092014, 2008 WL 2746722, at *4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. July
16, 2008) (holding that conduct which serves "no legitimate purpose" can in-
clude more than just conduct that lacks "ideas other than threats, intimidation,
or coercion"); In re R.T.T., 26 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (defining
conduct that has a "legitimate purpose" as that which is lawful, custom, or al-
lowed).
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (West 1999). It is not necessary that
the stalker "had the intent to actually carry out the threat." Id. Under the
statute, an electronic communication device "includes, but is not limited to,
telephones, cellular phones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or
pagers." Id. § 646.9(h).
88. Nick Zimmerman, Comment, Attempted Stalking: An Attempt-to-
Almost-Attempt-to-Act, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 219, 234 (2000) ("stalking seeks
to prevent a certain harm-murder, rape, etc.").
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argued that stalking is not an inchoate crime because its concern is
the infliction of a distinct "harm." As one law review article noted,
the "harm" stalking laws address is "a product of potential future
harm. Stalking is wrongful because the threat of future violence
causes emotional injury to the victim."'8 9
Florida took a slightly different approach by creating two
crimes: basic stalking and aggravated stalking.9 ° The basic stalking
offense required that the stalker (i) intend to inflict emotional
"harm" on the victim and (ii) willfully engage in repeated following
or harassment of the victim. 91 The aggravated stalking offense
added the requirement that the stalker make a "credible threat"
with the intention to cause the victim to fear for his or her safety. 92
Basic stalking was a misdemeanor, while aggravated stalking was a
felony.93
As society became more familiar with the nuances of the
conduct involved in and "harm" inflicted by stalking, states began
to expand the scope of their statutes. As one author noted, while
contemporary stalking statutes still tend to target "credible threats"
directed at the victim or victim's family, many also criminalize con-
duct that would cause a "'reasonable person' to . . .suffer severe
emotional distress., 94 Missouri's statute, for example, states that
anyone "who purposely and repeatedly harasses ... another person
commits the crime of stalking," and defines "harasses" as engaging
"in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that serves no
legitimate purpose, that would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and that actually causes substantial
emotional distress to that person.
' 95
The Missouri statute does not define "emotional distress,"
but other statutes do. The Michigan stalking statute defines it as
89. Guy, supra note 80, at 1010-11.




94. Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 134-35
(2007) (citations omitted).
95. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 1999).
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"significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not nec-
essarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counsel-
ing."96 The Michigan statute is very similar to the Missouri statute.
It defines stalking as "a willful course of conduct involving repeated
or continuing harassment ... that would cause a reasonable person
to feel terrorized, frightened, . . . harassed, or molested and that ac-
tually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened .... harassed,
or molested." 97 It defines "harassment" as "conduct directed to-
ward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or con-
tinuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individ-
ual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim
to suffer emotional distress." 98
A number of states have similar provisions," and some
courts have noted that stalking statutes are intended to prevent
"emotional harm" to victims.100 And while this is probably not nec-
essary, a few states have included language in their statutes to make
it clear that they apply to electronic stalking, or cyberstalking'O°
96. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h(1)(b) (West 2004).
97. Id. § 750.411h(1)(d). See also id. § 750.411h(2) (stalking is a crime).
98. Id. § 750.411h(1)(c).
99. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(4)(b)(III) (West 2008); D.C.
CODE § 22-404(b) (2001); FL. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-7906(l)(a) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(A) (2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-220(1) (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (2002); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(a) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9a (Lex-
isNexis 2005); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.32 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
506(a) (2009).
100. See Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 38 (Del. 1996); see also People v.
Furey, 784 N.Y.S.2d 922, 2004 WL 869586, at *2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Apr. 6, 2004)
(finding that stalking statutes focus on the victim's state of mind and the fear
the stalker is causing the victim).
101. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(d) (defining the term "cyber-
stalk"); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2(a) (2002) (outlining cyberstalking
and cyberharassment as distinct crimes). California does this by defining
"credible threat" as a threat communicated verbally, in writing or "through
the use of an electronic communication device." CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g)
(West 1999). An electronic communication device "includes, but is not limited
to, telephones, cellular phones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or
pagers." Id. § 646.9(h). It is probably not necessary to include language that
specifically refers to the use of computer or electronic technology to engage in
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Such language is probably not necessary because the essence of the
crime of stalking is, as with other crimes, the perpetrator's engaging
in activity that he or she knows will inflict certain "harm" upon the
victim with the purpose of inflicting such "harm." As long as stalk-
ing statutes proscribe the infliction of the prohibited "harm," the
means used to inflict it need not be set out in the statute.
10 2
While a number of states incorporate harassment into their
stalking statutes, either as a way of defining stalking or as a way of
defining a lesser-included offense of stalking, 103 a few have free-
standing harassment offenses that make it a crime to inflict emo-
tional distress on a victim. Delaware's harassment statute, for in-
stance, makes it a crime to "harass . . . another person" by insulting,
taunting or challenging them or engaging "in any other course of
alarming or distressing conduct which serves no legitimate purpose
and is in a manner which the person knows is likely to ... cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress."
' 104
stalking or cyberstalking, because the gravamen of the crime of stalking is in-
flicting affective harm on the victim; the method used to inflict such harm is
therefore irrelevant to the commission of the offense.
102. See, e.g., SUSAN W. BRENNER, LAW IN AN ERA OF "SMART"
TECHNOLOGY 137-83 (2007) (analyzing how personal relationships with tech-
nology can shift depending on methods of use and interaction levels, and how
criminal laws should develop to address the problem of technological misuse).
103. See supra notes 84 & 90; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229(a)(1)
(2005) (incorporating harassment into the stalking statute as a way of defining
stalking); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (2009) (proscribing stalking and har-
assment in the same statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (2007) (incorporating
harassment into the stalking statute as a way of defining stalking); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 711-1106.4 & 711-11-6.5 (1993) (incorporating harassment as a way
of defining a lesser-included offense of stalking); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-
7905 & 18-7906 (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West 2009) (in-
corporating harassment into the stalking statute as a way of defining stalking).
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007). See also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43A(a) (2002) (treating harassment as a separate of-
fense, and making it a crime to inflict emotional distress on a victim); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-2(A) (West 2003) (same).
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It has been difficult, and arguably problematic, for criminal
law to address the infliction of emotional "harm."" 5 The "emo-
tional distress" stalking and harassment statutes represent a com-
promise: although they criminalize the infliction of affective
"harm," they do not predicate the imposition of criminal liability
purely on self-diagnosed psychic injury. ' Instead, they incorporate
a "reasonable person" standard to ensure that the imposition of li-
ability is based not on the idiosyncrasies of a particular individual,
but on conduct that can be deemed to inflict an objectively ascer-
tainable "harm." 1
07
There is also a federal stalking statute: 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
Section 2261A(2) makes it a federal crime for
to "kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause
substantial emotional distress" to someone
or place the person "in reasonable fear" of
death or serious bodily injury to himself, to
105. For a characterization of this affective "harm," see Lamber Royak..
kers, The Dutch Approach to Stalking Laws, 3 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 2, IT 19-20,
27 (2000).
106. For the premise that affective "harm" is too idiosyncratic to provide
a reliable predicate for the imposition of criminal liability, see, for example,
Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology
of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 442 (2003) ("[U]nlike physical in-
jury, the severity of emotional injury permits few reliable inferences about the
act that led to the injury, because victims vary widely on how they respond and
express themselves emotionally to the same crime.").
107. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a) (defining harm as occur-
ring when a "reasonable person [would] suffer fear, alarm, or distress");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7906 (prohibiting conduct that "would cause a rea-
sonable person substantial emotional distress" or "to be in fear of death or se-
rious injury"). The inclusion of an objective standard also protects these stat-
utes from being held void for vagueness. See, e.g., People v. Cross, 114 P.3d 1,
7 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the statute at issue was not overly vague,
as it was "sufficiently specific to provide sufficient guidance to individuals
seeking to comply with the law and to law enforcement officers enforcing the
statute"), rev'd on other grounds, 127 P.3d 71 (Colo. 2006); State v. Partowkia,
No. 39060-1-1, 1999 WL458967 (Wash. App. July 6, 1999) (holding that a stalk-
ing statue was not overly broad or vague); see also State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d
212, 220-21 (Kan. 1996) (the lack of an objective standard defining stalking
terms caused the statute to be found void for vagueness).
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a member of his immediate family, or to his
spouse or intimate partner;
" to use the mail or the Internet or any other
facility of interstate or foreign commerce;
or
" to engage in a course of conduct that causes
"substantial emotional distress" to the vic-
tim or places him "in reasonable fear of the
death of, or serious bodily injury" to him-
self or to any of the persons listed above.
8
The federal statute is therefore both a "credible threat" and
an "emotional distress" stalking statute. The credible threat option
might apply to cyberbullying, but the residual option-the emo-
tional distress option-is more likely to be useful in this context.
To convict someone of this offense, the prosecution will have to
prove that he or she intended to cause "substantial emotional dis-
tress" to the victim(s) and used the mail or the Internet to engage in
a course of conduct that caused such distress.'0 9 The statute does
not define "substantial emotional distress."
2.Use Against Cyberbullying
In analyzing the use of harassment and stalking statutes
against cyberbullies, it is useful to divide cyberbullying into two
categories: direct cyberbullying and indirect cyberbullying. Each is
analyzed below.
The cyberbullying tactics we analyze in this section do not
rise to the level of a credible threat; we analyze threats in Part
II.D.2, infra. Here we are concerned with communications that
cause the victim to suffer substantial emotional distress (stalking)
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
109. The statute also, of course, makes it a crime to use the mail or the
Internet to kill, injure, or harass someone, or to make them reasonably fear
the death of or serious bodily injury to the persons listed above. See id. §
2261A(2). Since cyberbullying rarely rises to the level of threatening death or
serious bodily injury, the option outlined in the text above is the most likely to
be applicable to cyberbullying.
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or "harass or annoy" him or her (harassment). The discussion in
the first subsection analyzes the use of harassment or stalking; the
discussion in the second subsection focuses primarily on harassment
because the more stringent harm requirements of stalking make it
difficult to prosecute indirect cyberbullying as stalking. The third
subsection provides a general assessment of the potential for using
either or both crimes against cyberbullies.
a. Direct Cyberbullying
This category consists of situations in which the bully directs
electronic communications directly at the victim. It encompasses a
cyberbully's use of instant messaging, text or multimedia messaging,
or e-mail intended to have a direct, immediate effect on the victim.
The communications may be directed specifically at the vic-
tim, such as messages that call the victim "fat," "stupid," or a
"slut."'110 The messages can be more specifically personal. A few
years ago, a twelve-year-old girl was bullied by a former friend who
bombarded her with instant messages that said things such as
"[e]veryone hates you, I hate you, you have no friends.' 1 Direct
cyberbullies also start rumors (e.g., a female engaged in intercourse
or oral sex with one or more males) among the victim's friends or
peer group and use altered versions of messages to make it appear
the victim said things he or she did not. The actions of direct cy-
berbullies can aggregate, intentionally or inadvertently. Ryan Hal-
ligan, for example, was a Vermont eighth-grader who was the target
of an extensive cyberbullying campaign in which one student spread
a rumor that he was gay and a popular female student pretended to
110. See, e.g., Amanda Burgess Proctor, Sameer Hinduja & Justin W.
Patchin, Cyberbullying and Online Harassment. Reconceptualizing the Victimi-
zation of Adolescent Girls, in FEMALE CRIME VICTIMS: REALITY
RECONSIDERED 162, 168 (V. Garcia & J. Clifford eds., 2009) (victims reported
being called "fat," "ugly," "slut," and "bitch." among other "unpleasant
names").
111. Gretchen Voss, Mean-Kids.com, BOSTON MAGAZINE (Jan. 2006),
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/meankidscom/.
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like him, then mocked him by distributing their instant message ex-
changes to the whole school. 112
Can those who engage in conduct such as this be prosecuted
for stalking or harassment? Direct cyberbullying satisfies an essen-
tial-albeit implicit-requirement of both offenses: it is directed at
a specific victim. Like other crimes against persons, stalking and
harassment only encompass conduct that targets a particular indi-
vidual; this requirement derives both from the plain language of the
statutes criminalizing stalking and harassment, and from the fact
that both offenses criminalize what is, in effect, an emotional as-
sault.113
It is therefore at least conceptually possible that stalking
and harassment statutes could be used to prosecute those who en-
gage in direct cyberbullying. The critical question is whether the
conduct involved in direct cyberbullying can establish the mens rea,
actus reus, and harm requirements of stalking or harassment.
Since stalking and harassment are, at least to some extent,
evolved inchoate crimes, stalking and harassment statutes consis-
tently require the highest level of mens rea, i.e., that the perpetrator
acted intentionally, purposely, or willfully.11 4 To satisfy this re-
quirement, the prosecution would have to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the cyberbully engaged in conduct that was directed
at the victim and was intended to cause the proscribed harm. For
many stalking and harassment statutes, the proscribed harm is sub-
stantial emotional distress or emotional distress; for some harass-
ment statutes, it is conduct that "harasses or annoys" the victim.
The prosecutor will also have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the conduct the bully used was capable of, and did in fact in-
flict, the proscribed level of harm.
112. See id. (bullying eventually led Ryan to commit suicide).
113. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02(2)(a) (2008) (harassment re-
quires conduct directed at "a specific person"); see also Royakkers, supra note
105, at 20 (defining the different parts of stalking and discussing stalking as a
"mental assault").
114. The three terms are, for all practical purposes, synonyms. See, e.g.,
State v. Coca, 341 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Neb. 1983) (stating that "[i]ntentionally
means 'willfully' or 'purposely"'). As to specific intent and inchoate crimes,
see Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8 (1989).
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Satisfying these requirements is likely to be impossible ex-
cept in the most egregious cases, or when a prosecution is brought
under a harassment statute that requires conduct which merely
"harasses" or "annoys" the victim."' How, for example, is a prose-
cutor to show-beyond a reasonable doubt-that a cyberbully
acted with the purpose of causing his or her victim some level of
emotional distress? The prosecutor may well be able to show that
the victim suffered the requisite level of emotional distress, but we
cannot impose criminal liability simply because someone in fact in-
flicted emotional distress on another person. We all inflict emo-
tional distress on others from time to time, sometimes inadver-
tently, sometimes intentionally.
Establishing the bully's intent, and the causal nexus be-
tween that intent and the resultant harm to the victim, would be
critical in a stalking or harassment prosecution predicated on direct
cyberbullying. Many stalking and harassment statues include an
element that is designed to provide the empirical basis for a reason-
able inference of such intent: They require that a perpetrator have
purposely engaged in a "course of conduct" directed at a victim.1
6
This incorporates an objective element into the mens rea analysis: a
jury can infer the requisite mens rea (purpose or intent) both from
the nature of the defendant's conduct (here, the nature of the
communications used to target the victim) and from its persis-
tence.17
115. See Guy, supra note 80, at 992.
116. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923(A) (2001 & Supp. 2008)
(stating that "[a] person commits stalking if the person intentionally or know-
ingly engages in a course of conduct that is directed toward another person
and [listing additional elements]"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-32 (2006)
(defining course of conduct to mean "a pattern of conduct composed of a se-
ries of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose").
117. See, e.g., Shannon v. Anderson, 1996 WL 81495, at *2 (Minn. App.
1996) (holding that a defendant's "entire course of conduct reasonably sup-
port an inference of intent"); Commonwealth v. Spiropoulos, 1992 WL
494958, at *2 (Pa. C.P 1992) (holding that an isolated incident could not con-
stitute a course of conduct sufficient to support a charge of harassment); see
also Goodno, supra note 94, at 134-35 (explaining that the course of conduct
requirement ensures that only truly egregious behavior is prosecuted).
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A prosecutor might, therefore, be able to use a cyberbully's
direct engagement in a course of conduct targeting his or her victim
to establish that the perpetrator acted with the requisite mens rea.
That is, a prosecutor could use a bully's persistence in bombarding
the victim with harassing or tormenting messages to support the in-
ference that the cyberbully not only knew the effect the messages
would have on the victim, but wanted to cause this effect. Con-
versely, it would be very difficult-probably impossible-for a
prosecutor to rely on such an inference in a case in which the bully
sent only a single message, however horrific it might have been.
Indeed, the alleged bully's transmission of a single message could
inferentially rebut prosecutorial claims that the message was in-
tended to inflict emotional distress; the incident lacks the persis-
tence and consequent implicit calculation present whenever a
stalker or harasser consistently bombards the victim with offensive
or unwanted communications. The alleged bully could argue that
the message was the result of a transient fit of temper or pique, not
of an intent to cause emotional distress.
In many instances, the age of the alleged bully might have to
be factored into the intent to cause emotional distress calculus.
When an adult engages in a persistent, focused course of conduct
that inferentially demonstrates an intent to inflict some level of
emotional distress, it can-depending on the facts at issue-be rea-
sonable to infer that this was the adult's purpose. We attribute a
greater level of maturity and an ability to assess the consequences
of one's actions to adults. It may, again depending on the facts at
issue, be less reasonable to infer such intent when the perpetrator is
a juvenile. 118
It might be easier for a prosecutor to pursue charges under
a harassment statute that makes it a crime to "harass" or "annoy"
118. See generally A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1227-28 (Ind. 2008)
(explaining that the evidence did not support harassment charges against ju-
venile; instead of an intent to harass, it was "more plausible that A.B., then
fourteen years old, merely intended to amuse and gain approval ... from her
friends, and/or to generally vent anger for her personal grievances").
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someone, instead of causing emotional distress."9 Some of these
statutes also include the possibility of "alarming" the victim; many
state the alternatives (e.g., harass, annoy, alarm) severally, which
suggests that a prosecution could be predicated on simply "annoy-
ing" someone. 2 That, however, is unconstitutional. In Coates v.
Cincinnati,121 the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that
made it a crime for three or more persons to assemble on a side-
walk and "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by."' 122 The Court held that the statute was void for vague-
ness because "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy
others." 123 Courts have consequently held that harassment statutes
that make "annoy" one of several actus reus terms, any of which
can be used to hold someone liable for harassment, are void for
124vagueness.
119. See supra note 78. See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921(E)
(stating that harassment means "conduct directed at a specific person which
would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed
and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person"); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-4 (2004) (stating that "harasses means a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person").
120. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 n.1 (1971) (explain-
ing a Cincinnati ordinance that stated:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble,
except at a public meeting of citizens, on any of the side-
walks, street corners, vacant lots, or mouths of alleys, and
there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to per-
sons passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings. Who-
ever violates any of the provisions of this section shall be
fined not exceeding fifty dollars ($ 50.00), or be impris-
oned not less than one (1) nor more than thirty (30) days
or both.
§ 901-L6, CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES (1956)).
121. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
122. Id. at 611.
123. Id. at 614.
124. See, e.g., Karenev v. State, 258 S.W.3d 210, 216-17 (Tex. App. 2008)
(striking down a harassment statute that made it a crime to send electronic
communications that "annoy or alarm" the victim), rev'd on other grounds,
281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
"KIDDIE CRIME"
It would therefore not be possible to prosecute a direct cy-
berbully for harassment on the ground that he or she merely "an-
noyed" the victim. It would probably also not be possible to base
such a prosecution on the premise that the direct cyberbully
"alarmed" (or "annoyed" and "alarmed") the victim, since some
courts have held that predicating criminal liability on mere "alarm"
renders a statute void for vagueness. 25 Generally, courts have up-
held harassment statutes when they include some limiting condi-
tions, such as a requirement that the conduct have "no legitimate
purpose" or harm requirements that go beyond merely annoying or
alarming the victims. 12 Some have found that a statute's inclusion
of a specific intent to harass the victim is also sufficient to prevent
its being held void for vagueness.127
A prosecutor could probably prosecute a direct cyberbully
for harassment if he or she could show that the cyberbully acted
with the specific intent to inflict the proscribed harm (e.g., harass-
ment, annoyance, and alarm) and that the conduct at issue had no
legitimate purpose.128 However, prosecutors may also be able to in-
fer specific intent in this context, since harassment offenses encom-
pass the infliction of a lesser degree of harm than do most stalking
statues. While some harassment statutes allow liability to be predi-
cated upon the transmission of a single harassing message,121 it
125. See, e.g., Karenev 258 S.W.3d at 214-16.
126. Commonwealth v. Welch, 825 N.E.2d 1005, 1018-19 (Mass. 2005).
127. See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d 851, 867 (Md. 2001) (finding
the statute was not vague because of the reasonable person standard and re-
quirement of specific intent); People v. Shack, 658 N.E.2d 706, 712 (N.Y. 1995)
("By including a specific intent element in the statute, the Legislature has re-
moved the possibility that a Defendant could be unaware of his criminal con-
duct.").
128. The Delaware harassment statute, for example, should provide the
constitutional predicate for such a prosecution. See 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.11,
§ 1311(a)(1) (2007) (stating that a person commits harassment when he or she
"insults, taunts or challenges another person or engages in any other course of
alarming or distressing conduct which serves no legitimate purpose and is in a
manner which the person knows is likely to ... cause a reasonable person to
suffer fear, alarm, or distress").
129. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2001) (requiring
only "a communication" to violate the statute).
20091
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
might be difficult to obtain a conviction under such a statute when
the prosecution was predicated on direct cyberbullying, just as it
should be difficult to obtain a conviction for stalking in the same
circumstances.
What about situations in which the discrete acts of two or
more cyberbullies target the same victim? Since the aggregated
harm is likely to be more severe when direct cyberbullies collec-
tively target one victim, it could be easier to infer specific intent in
this context if the prosecution could show that the bullies knew of
each other and intentionally combined their efforts to inflict greater
harm on the victim. 3' If this is a viable option, it should apply in
130. The conceptual difficulty with doing this could lie in finding a basis
for imputing the intent of one direct cyberbully to another or others, and vice
versa. There are no reported cases involving charges of conspiring to commit
criminal harassment, but if a prosecutor could use a conspiracy charge to link
the cyberbullies together, that would provide a basis for imputing each bully's
individual intent to the others. Cf, e.g., United States v. Cabrera, 284 F.
App'x 674, 686 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to
show both conspiracy and individual intent to commit the substantive FDCA
offense charged); People v. Hardy, 825 P.2d 781, 816 (Cal. 1992) (holding that
the evidence supported the charge of conspiracy to commit murder).
The other, perhaps less viable possibility for using the actions of another
cyberbully or other cyberbullies as the basis for inferring that Direct Cyber-
bully "A" had the specific intent to commit harassment or stalking lies in the
law of accomplice liability. An accomplice can be held liable for the conduct
of someone whom he "aids ... or attempts to aid" in the commission of a
crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06. Courts have found that someone quali-
fies as an accomplice if he or she encouraged the commission of a crime. See,
e.g., Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823, 828 n.1 (2009). Waddington
quotes a Washington statute that states:
[a] person is an accomplice of another person in the com-
mission of a crime if. . . [w]ith knowledge that it will pro-
mote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he ... (i)
solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other
person to commit it; or . .. (ii) aids or agrees to aid such
other person in planning or committing it.
Id.
Arguably, then, if two or more direct cyberbullies collaboratively inflict
the harm proscribed by a stalking or harassment statute, then each is an ac-
complice of the other. Courts have found that an accomplice's specific intent
to commit a crime can be inferred from his or her collaboration with others
who intended to commit that crime. See United States v. McNeil, 106 F.
[Vol. 8
both stalking and harassment cases. If, as seems more likely, each
cyberbully acted independently of the others, each would have to
be treated as a distinct case with regard to mens rea, actus reus, and
resultant harm.
In sum, prosecutions for stalking or harassment are a poten-
tial means of addressing cyberbullying, at least in the most egre-
gious cases. The stringent mens rea requirements for both crimes,
coupled with the age of the perpetrator(s), will make it difficult, or
impossible, to bring such prosecutions when the conduct involved in
the bullying was isolated or sporadic and the substance tended to be
petty rather than malicious.
b. Indirect Cyberbullying
In indirect cyberbullying, the cyberbully does not direct the
electronic communications that constitute the bullying at his or her
victim directly. Instead, the bully posts them on MySpace, Face-
book, a specially created website or blog, or some other reasonably
public area of cyberspace. This aspect of indirect cyberbullying
gives rise to two issues, neither of which arises with direct cyberbul-
lying: (1) to what extent did the cyberbully intentionally direct the
online communication(s) at the victim; and (2) to what extent did
he or she intend the communication(s) to be seen by others whose
reactions were likely to have a negative impact on the victim?13
App'x 294, 299-300 (6th Cir. 2004). The problem with this theory is that ac-
complice liability applies only when there is a principal, i.e., a person who ac-
tually commits the crime. Accomplices by definition play a supporting role in
the collaborative commission of a crime. If a collective direct cyberbullying
scenario involved one cyberbully who played a leading role by, say, directing
the others, then this theory should apply. If, on the other hand, each cyber-
bully acted independently of the others, it should not.
131. The negative impact can take various forms; for example, loss of ac-
tual or potential employment, humiliation, professional discipline, or impair-
ment of relations with the victim's family and friends.
These issues do not arise with direct cyberbullying because the direct cy-
berbully specifically directs the communications that are the vehicle for the
bullying at the victim. As we saw in the previous section, this can take the
form of transmitting the communications to the victim (only), transmitting
them to members of the victim's peer or family group (only), or transmitting
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Two recent cases address these issues. In State v. Ellison,
132
high school student Ripley Ellison was convicted of harassment af-
ter she posted a photograph of Savannah Gerhard, a classmate (and
former best friend), on her MySpace page with the caption "Mo-
lested a little boy." 13 The posting referred to a falling-out the two
had when they were in the seventh grade after Ripley's younger
brother accused Savannah of molesting him.134 The Department of
Job and Family Services (JFS) investigated the allegation, but did
not find "enough evidence to substantiate" the boy's claim.'35
When Savannah heard about the posting, she read Ripley's
MySpace page. Some time earlier, she had seen a "short remark"
Ripley posted "on a contemporary's MySpace page that also re-
ferred to the molestation accusation," but Savannah said Ripley
had never "directly communicated these postings" to her, even
though she, too, had a MySpace account."' After she read the cap-
tion on the photograph, Savannah complained to authorities at her
school, which led to Ripley being charged with, and convicted of,
criminal harassment. 137
At Ripley's bench trial, Savannah reiterated that Ripley
"never directly communicated with her over the Internet and that
she had sought out the postings." Savannah also said she felt "'har-
assed' by the postings" and had overheard Ripley making "a similar
remark about her at school." 138 Ripley testified that "she believed
her brother's accusations" against Savannah and gave this explana-
tion for posting the offensive material: "I think that other people
need to know how she is. And she denies everything, but a lot of
people believe that she did it. And I was told that she did it. And
so I think that other people have a right to know." 139 Ripley was
them to both groups. In each of these alternatives, the focus is on the victim, a
focus which is lacking or ambiguous in indirect cyberbullying.
132. 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).









convicted of one count of telecommunications harassment; she ap-
pealed.
The statute Ripley was convicted of violating required that
the defendant have "made a telecommunication ... with [the] pur-
pose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person."' 40 Ripley ar-
gued first that since she had not directly contacted Savannah, she
had not made a telecommunication within the meaning of the stat-
ute.14 ' The Ohio Court of Appeals disagreed. It noted that the leg-
islature defined telecommunication broadly as including the "dis-
semination" of a communication, and so declined to hold that a
direct communication is required for a violation of the harassment
statute. 142
Ripley's real argument was that the "lack of a direct com-
munication" targeting Savannah negated any inference that she had
the specific intent to harass. The court of appeals began its
analysis of this issue by noting that Black's Law Dictionary defines
harassment as "[w]ords, conduct, or action ... that, being directed
at a specific person,... alarms or causes substantial emotional dis-
tress in the person."' 1  The court then explained that the statute
creates a
specific-intent crime: the state must prove the
defendant's specific purpose to harass. The
burden is not met by establishing only that the
defendant knew or should have known that her
conduct would probably cause harassment.
The legislature has created this substantial bur-
den to limit the statute's scope to criminal con-
duct, not the expression of offensive speech. 141
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21(B) (LexisNexis 2004).
141. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 230.
142. Id. at 230 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.01 (LexisNexis
2004)).
143. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 230.
144. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 733 (8th ed. 2004)). The
dictionary definition also included "annoys" as a harm, but the court of ap-
peals noted that the legislature had deleted this term from the Ohio harass-
ment statute some years before. See id.
145. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 230.
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The court of appeals held that the state failed to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Ripley's specific intent in posting the
statement was to harass Savannah. At trial, the prosecutor had ar-
gued that posting the allegation after the JFS could not substantiate
the accusation proved that Ripley's purpose was to harass Savan-
nah. 146 The court of appeals found that JFS's finding did not mean
the "dissemination of the allegation could not serve the legitimate
purpose of warning others of what [Ripley] Ellison believed to be
criminal behavior. Moreover, it was undisputed that [Ripley] Elli-
son never directed a telecommunication to [Savannah] Gerhard de-
spite the opportunity to do so. ' 147 It reversed the conviction and
discharged Ripley from further prosecution based on this inci-
dent. 1
48
While the Ellison court focused on whether Ripley had the
required specific intent to direct the communication at Savannah,
the case also implicated whether Ripley intended for the communi-
cations to be seen by others whose reactions were likely to have a
negative impact on Savannah. As the court of appeals explained,
Ripley's posting of the comment about Savannah on her MySpace
page is conduct that differs in several material respects from the
conduct involved in direct cyberbullying. First, it was not directed
at the victim. It was, instead, put on a website for all to see. Al-
though it is reasonable to infer Ripley knew, or must have known,
that Savannah might see the comment, this does not seem to have
been her purpose. Instead, it appears she was acting out of a desire
to warn people about someone she believed to be a threat to small
children. Posting the comment was, therefore, an act of pure
speech-communicating information or an opinion to the public-
rather than an act in furtherance of a crime.
The resolution of the second issue is more problematic. We
know Ripley posted the comment on her MySpace page; we also
know that she posted a comment about the alleged molestation on
a "contemporary's" MySpace page, and that Savannah was able to
view the comment on Ripley's MySpace page. This suggests that





Ripley's posting was accessible to other students at the high school
she and Savannah attended. Because the court did not address the
accessibility of this comment, it is impossible to know, with cer-
tainty, its potential reach. However, as most MySpace users "leave
their profiles open to the public," 149 it is reasonable to assume that
it was widely available. Therefore, while the facts do not establish
that Ripley made an intentional, focused effort to get the informa-
tion out to the broadest audience possible, they do not negate the
inference that her purpose was informational. That, though, is
enough to prevent the imposition of criminal liability for harass-
ment because, as the court of appeals noted, when a crime requires
specific intent, it is not enough to show that the defendant knew or
should have known her conduct could constitute harassment.
The other relevant case is A.B. v. State.5' The juvenile
known as "A.B." was a student at Greencastle Middle School in
Greencastle, Indiana when the 2005-2006 school year began. 151 At
the time, Shawn Gobert had been principal of Greencastle Middle
School for thirteen years. 152 A.B. transferred to another school
"sometime" before February 2006, which is when Gobert learned
that a
"Mr. Gobert" "profile" had been created on a
MySpace... page, purportedly by him, and on
which A.B. had posted a vulgarity-laced tirade
directed against him. In fact, another juvenile,
R.B., a friend of A.B. and ... a student at
Greencastle Middle School, had created this
false "Mr. Gobert" . . . "profile" and allowed
access to it by twenty-six designated "friends,"
one of whom was A.B. A.B.... made her post-
ing about Mr. Gobert on this private "profile."
Thereafter,... A.B. created her own MySpace
149. Illinois State University Computer Helpdesk, MySpace Privacy Set-
tings and Safer Social Networking, http://www.helpdesk.ilstu.edu/kb/index.ph
tml?kbid=1320 (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
150. 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008).
151. Id. at 1225.
152. Id.
2009]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW
"group" page, accessible by the general public,
and titled with a vulgar expletive directed
against Mr. Gobert and Greencastle schools.153
In delinquency proceedings, A.B. was charged with, and
convicted of, conduct "that if committed by an adult would consti-
tute Harassment, a class B felony" under Indiana law. 114 A.B. ap-
pealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, claiming the evidence did not
prove that she acted with the intent required by the Indiana har-
assment statute."' The court agreed and reversed her conviction.
1 6
The Indiana Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
that the harassment statute makes it a crime for one acting with the
"intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person" and "with no in-
tent of legitimate communication" to use a "computer network" ei-
ther to "communicate with" or "transmit an obscene message or in-
decent or profane words to a person."'57 A.B. was charged with
violating both provisions, but the Indiana court found this did not
affect its analysis because the "intent element is the same for both
violations." 158 It noted that for someone "to commit an act with the
intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, common sense in-
forms that the person must have a subjective expectation that the
offending conduct will likely come to the attention of the person
targeted for the harassment, annoyance, or alarm."' 59
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that the counts differed
with regard to whether the postings were "publicly accessible."'
160
Four counts were based on "A.B.'s postings on her friend's false
153. Id. According to the Indiana Supreme Court, one of the postings on
the fake "Mr. Gobert" page read: "hey you piece of greencastle s**t. what the
f**k do you think of me know (sic) that you cant [sic] control me? huh? ha ha
ha guess what ill [sic] wear my f**king piercings all day long and to school and
you cant [sic] do s**t about it.! ha ha f**king ha! stupid b**tard!" Id.
154. Id. at 1225 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a)(4) (LexisNexis
2004)).
155. 885 N.E.2d at 1226.
156. Id. at 1228.
157. Id. at 1225-26 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a)(4) (Lex-
isNexis 2004)).





'Mr. Gobert' private MySpace 'profile,"' while the other two were
based on "language used in the public MySpace 'group' page cre-
ated by A.B." '161 The trial court's written findings of fact did not dif-
ferentiate between the public and private postings:
Mr. Gobert is the principal. The web site was
accessible by other students and the public. It
is obvious to the Court that such information,
while not directly sent to Mr. Gobert, was going
to end up with him, due to the job and standing
within the juvenile community.
While the court does not know exactly what
[A.B.'s] intent was, from the common sense
reading of the displayed message, the Court can
not envision any other intent but to harass, an-
noy or alarm.
[T]he Court can not envision when such com-
munication could be labeled "legitimate.,
162
The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed. It noted that be-
cause A.B.'s posting on R.B.'s private MySpace profile could not be
seen by anyone except those to whom R.B. had granted access,
Gobert was only able to see it after R.B. "authorized him to access
the 'profile' during his investigation" of the comments.163 As a re-
sult, the court found there was no evidence that A.B. expected
Gobert to "see or learn about" her posting on R.B.'s private pro-
file. 64 This meant that neither the evidence nor "reasonable infer-
ences" established that when A.B. made her posting on R.B.'s pri-
vate profile, she had a "subjective expectation that her conduct
would likely come to the attention of Mr. Gobert."
1 65
The Indiana Supreme Court found the analysis differed for
the counts that were based on "A.B.'s remarks on her MySpace
'group' page. Because this site was publicly accessible, it may be
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1226-27 (quoting from Appellant's Appendix) (citations omit-
ted).
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reasonably inferred that A.B. had a subjective expectation that her
words would likely reach Mr. Gobert." 166 It concluded, however,
that this was not sufficient to establish the intent required by the
Indiana harassment statute. As noted above, the statute requires
that the person have acted with the "intent to harass, annoy, or
alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communica-
tion." 161
The only evidence of A.B.'s intent with regard to the public
postings was what she said in this post:
[R.B.] made a harmless joke profile for Mr.
Gobert. and [sic] some retarded b**ch printed
it out and took it to the office. [R.B.] is ex-
pelled, has to go to court, might have to go to
girl [sic] school, and has to take the 8th grade
over again! that's [sic] just from the school, her
paretns [sic] have grounded her, and took [sic]
her computer, she cant [sic] be online untill
[sic] 2007! GMS is full of over reacting idiots! 161
The Indiana Supreme Court found this post presented
"strong evidence that A.B. intended her 'group' page as legitimate
communication of her anger and criticism of the disciplinary action
of Mr. Gobert ... against her friend." 169 It also found that the post
made it "impossible for the State to have carried its burden to
prove" that A.B. had "no intent of legitimate communication. ' i0
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1225 (emphasis added) (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-
2(a) (LexisNexis 2004)).
168. 885 N.E.2d at 1227.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court also took issue with the trial court's
finding that "it could not 'envision' any intent other than to harass, annoy, or
alarm Mr. Gobert .... [and that] it is ... more plausible that A.B., then four-
teen-years old, merely intended to amuse and gain approval or notoriety from




The A.B. court's holding is both correct and instructive.
While it may not be impossible to convict someone who engages in
indirect cyberbullying of harassment, it is highly unlikely. When an
indirect cyberbully posts ostensibly bullying messages on a website
or other online resource the putative victim cannot access, it will be
difficult to prove that his or her intention was to harass that person.
As we noted earlier, stalking and harassment both assume conduct
directed at the victim; they do so because that assumption is implicit
in the essential dynamic of traditional, malum in se crimes. For
such a crime to have been committed, there must have been a per-
petrator, actual or contemplated harm, and a victim who was the
target of that harm. 171 In the physical world, the nexus between
perpetrator, victim, and consequent harm is inevitably direct; there
is no other way to inflict harm in the real world. 7 2 Even if the per-
petrator uses an intermediary-an accomplice-to inflict the con-
templated harm, the nexus between perpetrator and victim is still
direct; the accomplice is merely the perpetrator's tool.
When cyberspace is the vector of activity-especially ex-
pressive activity-the existence of such a nexus becomes uncertain.
We have all said things that could harm others in more or less seri-
ous ways, never intending that they reach the person in question.
They usually do not because social mores inhibit most of us from
telling A what B said about him. Additionally, our reliance on the
171. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal
Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 63 (2008) [hereinafter
Fantasy Crime] (discussing how contemplated-but not realized-harm is the
premise underlying the criminalization of inchoate crimes).
172. Even if the perpetrator attempts to inflict harm remotely-by, say,
putting a time bomb on the airplane on which the victim will fly-the dynamic
still exists. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 233 P.2d 660, 667 (Cal. App. 1951) (de-
tailing how defendant committed "acts directly tending toward the commis-
sion ... of murder in that he constructed an incendiary bomb, placed it beyond
his control so that it would be delivered to the airplane," where it would have
exploded had it not done so before being loaded on to the plane). Had the
bomb gone off as scheduled, Mr. Grant would not have been present when his
wife and children perished in the resulting plane crash, but he would still have
been the direct cause of their deaths.
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presumptive confidentiality of the critiques we share with our
friends and family would negate any inference of an intent to harass
in the unlikely event we were prosecuted. The idea of prosecuting
someone on the basis of such conduct seems absurd, 173 yet it is func-
tionally analogous to what happened to A.B.
The differentiating factor in A.B. (and similar cases) is that
the presumptive confidentiality we assume in the real world be-
comes problematic online, at least when the actor posts comments
on a site that is at least potentially accessible to the target of the
comments. When we post "irritating or malicious gossip' ' 174 online,
we publish the comments to the world. However, if we post com-
ments without considering whether the target is likely to see them,
we do not engage in the premeditated, focused communications in-
volved in direct cyberbullying. Despite this, we have still published
communications that have the potential to reach the victim. If our
comments actually reach the victim, they may well inflict the type of
harm prohibited by harassment and stalking statutes. The problem,
as the A.B. court noted, lies in the lack of specific intent. Reckless-
ness or negligence cannot (and should not) support the imposition
of criminal liability for stalking or harassment.
Stalking and harassment laws are not appropriate ways to
deal with this phenomenon because they were crafted to deal with a
specific type of malicious communication. The harms they encom-
pass derive from the persistent, intentional violation of an essential
norm governing gossip: gossip is shared with people other than the
person whom it concerns. Harassment and stalking often involve
173. The drafters of the Model Penal Code found that "penal law need
not address itself to... irritating or malicious gossip," and so chose not to in-
clude criminal defamation in the final version of the Model Penal Code.
Susan W. Brenner, Should Online Defamation Be Criminalized?, 76 MIss. L.J.
705, 716 (2007) [hereinafter Online Defamation] (citation omitted). See, e.g.,
Michael Passaportis, A Law and Norms Critique of the Constitutional Law of
Defamation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2004) (discussing the impact of false
gossip); see also THE CHAMBERS DIcrIONARY 645 (Ian Brookes ed., Cham-
bers 10th ed. 2006) (1901) (defining gossip as "scandalous rumours; ... some-
one who goes about telling ... idle, malicious and scandalous tales" about
someone who is not present). Gossip can be true or false.




bombarding the victim with what would constitute gossip if it were
shared with others.17 1 It is this premeditated, malicious targeting of
the victim that distinguishes simple (non-criminal) gossip from har-
assment or stalking. When it comes to gossip, ignorance may not be
bliss, but it eliminates any need to use criminal liability to control
what is being said about someone.
How should we handle situations in which this malicious
targeting is absent but the online circulation of gossip still inflicts
harm on the person it concerns? We are dealing with a new prob-
lem, one that could not have arisen prior to the Internet (just as
telephone harassment did not exist until the use of telephones be-




the publication of material (gossip, rumor, news, etc.) was con-
trolled by the mainstream media. Corporations engaged in dis-
seminating content via print, radio, and television signals. The ma-
terial the mainstream media publish is limited by two factors. First,
the cost involved in publication by traditional means acts as a de
facto content filter; publishing material about matters of general
public interest is likely to be more profitable than publishing mate-
rial that will interest only a few people. Second, the possibility of
being sued (for defamation, copyright infringement, invasion of pri-
vacy, etc.) causes mainstream media companies to rely on a cadre
of professional editors, reporters, and other staff, whose collective
purpose is to filter content and prevent the publication of action-
able material.
17
As a result of potential liability, the mainstream media (i)
publish gossip about people whose lives are likely to be of general
public interest (celebrities) but (ii) do not publish gossip about non-
celebrities, i.e., those whose lives will almost certainly not be of in-
175. In State v. Ellison, for example, the prosecution's theory was that
"Ellison had posted a 'rumor' on the Internet to harass Gerhard." 900 N.E.2d
228, 230 (Ohio App. 2008). For gossip as rumor, see supra note 173. In this
discussion we are not concerned with gossip that rises to the level of defama-
tion. We address that issue in the next section.
176. See Internet, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet (last
visited Sept. 7, 2009).
177. See Online Defamation, supra note 173, at 739-48.
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terest to the general public.178 This meant that prior to the Internet,
non-celebrities bore little, if any, risk of having gossip about them-
selves circulated among a wider audience. Gossip stayed where it
had always been-within the localized group comprising the indi-
vidual's co-workers, acquaintances, friends, and family.
The Internet changed that. Now we all face the prospect of
experiencing what was once the sole province of Hollywood celeb-
rities. We can have our own paparazzi, whether we like it or not.
179
Unlike professional paparazzi (who are motivated by profit), our
paparazzo (or paparazzi) may be motivated by jealousy, insecurity,
or boredom. And unlike those who have traditionally been the tar-
gets of paparazzi, we have done nothing to inject ourselves into the
public arena. 8 ' We expect celebrities to shrug off the more or less
accurate (but usually embarrassing) gossip paparazzi generate
about them; but those of us who are not celebrities are outraged
when our own, freelance paparazzi do something similar to us.
Should criminal stalking and harassment laws be expanded
to encompass online gossip about private citizens? Here, we are
concerned with the general, non-targeted publication involved in
indirect cyberbullying. If, as noted earlier, the publication of the
material were targeted specifically at the victim, as in direct cyber-
bullying, it might be possible to prosecute under existing stalking
and harassment laws. Indirect cyberbullying raises a different and
much more difficult issue: the imposition of criminal liability for the
general publication of non-defamatory gossip."'
178. This does not mean, of course, that the mainstream media do not
occasionally publish "human interest" stories about charming or dreadful oc-
currences in the lives of everyday people.
179. For the general phenomenon of online celebrity, see Jason Tanz,
Internet Famous: Julia Allison and the Secrets of Self-Promotion, WIRED, July
15, 2008, http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/magazine/1 6 -
08/howtoallison.
180. See, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty, The Public Disclosure of Private Facts:
There Is Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 93, 136 (2001) ("Private
citizens... have not assumed the risk of reduced privacy as public figures have
as part of their bargain for fame and influence.").
181. We consider defamation in the next section.
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Celebrities have on occasion sought to use stalking or har-
assment laws against their paparazzi, but those efforts have been
predicated on the trespasses and assaults paparazzi often use to ob-
tain photographs of celebrity targets.1 12 Trespasses and physical en-
counters provide the victim-targeted conduct that is missing in indi-
rect cyberbullying, and therefore make the use of stalking and
harassment reasonable in the celebrity paparazzi context. Indirect
cyberbullies do not engage in such conduct, which makes the appli-
cability of current stalking and harassment laws problematic in this
context. 183
We seem to be left with two alternatives. One is to expand
current criminal stalking or harassment laws so they encompass the
generalized publication of gossip that constitutes indirect cyberbul-
lying. The other is to accept our new-found, and perhaps unwel-
come, status as "lower-case" public figures, i.e., as someone whose
personality, appearance, activities, or predilections can become
grist for an amateur online paparazzo (or paparazzi).
While some may find the first alternative appealing, it
would be unworkable in practice and is almost certainly unconstitu-
tional. It would be unworkable because the criminal justice system
would be inundated with requests for prosecutions, most of which
would be denied due to a lack of resources. Rejected requests
might lead the original victim to retaliate in kind, which could lead
to a consequent, also likely-to-be-rejected request for prosecution
by the cyberbully-become-victim. While prosecutions might be
brought in a few particularly egregious cases, they would probably
do little to discourage determined cyberbullies. As to the constitu-
tional issues, expanded stalking and harassment statutes criminaliz-
ing the circulation of simple gossip would likely violate the First
182. See Sienna Miller wins £53,000 damages from photographers over
harassment, TELEGRAPH (U. K.), Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk
Inewslnewstopics/celebritynews/ 3496197/Sienna-Miller-wins-53000-damages-
from-photographers-over-harassment.html; Howard Gensler, For 'Stalking'
Photog, About-Face in Willis Case, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, June 20, 2006, 2006
WLNR 10597677.
183. If an indirect cyberbully were to engage in such conduct to acquire
gossip he or she could publish online, then the bully might be susceptible to
prosecution under existing stalking or harassment laws.
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Amendment because they would bar the publication of non-
defamatory content and opinion. 114 They would probably also be
held void for vagueness due to the difficulty involved in articulating
what was, and was not, permissible in online commentary about
185
someone.
That leaves the second alternative, which is eminently feasi-
ble but more than a little unsatisfying. We would have to tolerate
the aggravating attentions of those who choose to become our pa-
parazzi (unless their conduct could be prosecuted under one of the
theories we have yet to examine). We would have to accept the
proposition that has been bandied about for more than decade: cy-
berspace transforms everyone into a public figure, or more accu-
rately, cyberspace has the potential to transform everyone into a
public figure. If some more or less deranged person decides to
spread gossip about us online, we have to deal with it ourselves.
We can ignore it or respond in kind or, if the gossip is particularly
annoying, try to have it taken off the site on which it is posted. Be-
yond that, there probably is nothing we can do (absent, again, the
applicability of one of the theories examined below).
While this alternative may seem unsettling and unsatisfying
to us, that may not always be true. We find this alternative unsatis-
fying because we are used to a world in which we have been able to
ignore what is said about us, at least for the most part. We know, at
some level, that our friends, colleagues, and acquaintances gossip
184. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Be-
tween Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 781 n.19
(2007) ("A city ordinance that forbade residents to gossip about private mat-
ters would surely be unconstitutional under the First Amendment"); see also
Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that a munici-
pal fire department rule forbidding firemen from "'being a party to any mali-
cious gossip"' did not violate the First Amendment because it only applied to
"false statements made with knowledge of their falsity or made with reckless
disregard of whether they are false or true").
185. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (discuss-
ing the "basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."); see also State v. Palendrano, 293
A.2d 747, 752 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1972) (noting that a "neighborhood gos-
sip could . . . be indicted as a Common Scold" and holding that the statute
making it a crime to be a Common Scold was void for vagueness).
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about us behind our backs, but as long as we do not know what they
say, we can ignore it. When what they say migrates online, it be-
comes difficult-if not impossible-to ignore. Because we are the
products of a real-world culture which dictates that gossip is not to
reach the person it concerns, we are likely to be outraged and want
the perpetrators sanctioned, somehow. But that reaction may be an
historical artifact, the product of a non-networked culture. As one
author noted:
In a bygone era, members of a community
would gather at the local soda fountain to
"chew the fat"-discuss ... local politics, share
the latest gossip, or complain about the
weather. These days, millions of people are
engaged in the same conversations not over
root beer floats at soda fountains, but over
keyboards in online communities known as so-
cial-networking web sites."'
As social networking becomes more pervasive, we are likely
to become more accustomed to-and more comfortable with-the
fact that "chewing the fat" has migrated online, and the attendant
reality that gossip can easily leak into wider circulation. If it simply
leaks, and is not deliberately directed at the person it concerns (di-
rect cyberbullying), we may have to live with that. The pragmatic
assumptions we tend to make about when gossip reaches its target
in the real world will no longer be valid, which may make the no-
tion of holding the leaker criminally liable for what he or she has
done hopelessly problematic.
B. Defamation
In theory, criminal defamation laws could be used to prose-
cute cyberbullies, at least in certain instances. In practice, defama-
tion prosecutions are exceedingly unlikely, as we explain below.
The first section reviews the history and current status of criminal
186. John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers
in Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1219-20 (2007) (citations omit-
ted).
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defamation in the United States; the second analyzes the viability of
prosecuting cyberbullies for defamation.
1. The Crime
Defamation is a relatively new crime in Anglo-American
law."' In the early seventeenth century, the English Court of Star
Chamber criminalized defamatory comments directed toward an
individual on the theory that "they tend to create breaches of the
peace when the defamed ... undertake to revenge themselves on
the defamer."' 88 The Court of Star Chamber used the Roman doc-
trine of libellis famosis to create the new offense, which is why it
came to be known as libel.8 9 English colonists brought the offense
with them when they came to America, and it eventually became
part of the criminal law of the states.190
Since it was meant to prevent dueling and other forms of
physical conflict, criminal libel has traditionally been consigned to
the category of "offenses against the public peace."19' The
187. Common law divided defamation into two categories: libel (written
defamation) and slander (oral defamation). As several have noted, modern
technology blurs the distinction between the two. See Robert J. Hawley, An
Overview of the Uniform Defamation Act, 3883 PLI/Pat 645, 679 (1992). As a
result, most modern defamation cases involve libel, rather than slander. See
Karen Alexander Horowitz, When Is § 230 Immunity Lost: The Transforma-
tion from Website Owner to Information Content Provider,
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a014Horowitz.html (last visited
Sept. 6, 2009).
188. Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dis-
semination of Ideas and Data Be Criminalized, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273,
316 (2003) [hereinafter Complicit Publication]; see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 489 (Harry W. Jones ed., The Foundation
Press 1982) (1957) ("The reason libel was recognized as a crime at common
law was because of its tendency to stir up breaches of the peace.").
189. For more on the history of criminal libel, see Complicit Publication,
supra note 188, at 287-334.
190. See Online Defamation, supra note 173, at 713-14.
191. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 188, at 477-92 (including
criminal libel in offenses against public peace, which also included fighting,
riot, carrying weapons, and forcible entry).
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gravamen of the crime was publishing material that was likely "to
cause disorder, riot or breach of the peace."' 92
Though it was an established common law crime, criminal
libel was rarely prosecuted in the United States in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, which was one of the reasons the drafters
of the Model Penal Code gave for not including it in their template
of offenses.' 93 In their commentary on this issue, they said deciding
"whether to penalize anything like libel" was "one of the hardest
questions" they confronted. 194 They began with the premise that
''penal sanctions cannot be justified ... by the fact that defamation
is damaging to a person in ways that entitle him to maintain a civil
suit.,, 195  Noting that penal sanctions are only appropriate for
"harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community's
sense of security," the drafters of the Model Penal Code considered
whether libel falls into this category. 196 They concluded that behav-
ior "exceptionally disturbs the community's sense of security" for
either of two reasons: the "harm" inflicted "is very grave, as in rape
or murder, so that even the remote possibility of being ... victim-
ized terrifies us. Or our alarm may, as in the case of petty theft or
malicious mischief, derive from the higher likelihood that such
lesser harms will be inflicted upon us." 197
The architects of the Model Penal Code found that "per-
sonal calumny falls in neither of these classes" and is "therefore in-
appropriate for penal control," which probably explained "the pau-
city of prosecutions" and "near desuetude of private criminal libel"
laws in the United States. 198 Accordingly, they did not include a li-
bel provision in the final version of the Code. 199 As a result, while
192. Tucker v. State, 275 P. 382, 382 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929).
193. See Online Defamation, supra note 173, at 715-16.





198. Id. The drafters also cited First Amendment concerns. See id. at 45.
199. See id. at 45-46.
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libel is included in the criminal codes of some states, it tends to be a
minor crime and is almost never prosecuted.'z0
At least nineteen states criminalize general libel; three oth-
ers criminalize specific types of libel.2 1 The general libel statutes
fall into two categories: those that focus on causing a "breach of the
peace"' ' 2 and those that focus on publishing a "statement or object
tending to ... impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation
or expose the natural defects [of someone] and thereby to expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. 20 3 At common law,
200. See, e.g., Edward L. Carter, Outlaw Speech on the Internet: Examin-
ing the Link Between Unique Characteristics of Online Media and Criminal Li-
bel Prosecutions, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 289, 293-97
(2005) (explaining that many states' libel statutes have been deemed unconsti-
tutional, and that there have been relatively few criminal prosecutions for li-
bel). Every state recognizes a civil cause of action for defamation, but we do
not consider civil libel here for two reasons: one is that our focus is on the vi-
ability of using criminal liability to control cyberbullying; the other is that civil
liability is generally ineffective in discouraging online defamation. See Online
Defamation, supra note 173, at 721-22, 739-48.
201. Florida, for example, defines criminal defamation as speech that
"falsely and maliciously" imputes "a want of chastity" to a woman. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 836.04 (West 2006). Massachusetts defines criminal libel as ma-
liciously publishing material intended to "promote hatred of a group of per-
sons" based on their race, color or religion. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 98C
(LexisNexis 1992).
202. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (1975). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
40(a) (2007) (defining criminal defamation as "communicat[ing] false matter
[tending] to provoke a breach of the peace"); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-417
(2009) (defining similar provision).
203. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-105(1) (West 2008). See also
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4801 (2004) (defining libel as published information
that impeaches "honesty, integrity"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004(a) (2007)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2007) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.765(1) (West 2009) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(1) (2007)
(same): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11(1) (LexisNexis 2007) (same); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (West 2003) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01(1)
(1997) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 771 (West 2002) (same); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-7-150 (2003) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404(1) (2008)
(same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.010 (West 2003) (same); WIS. STAT.
ANN. 942.01(2) (West 2005) (same). The respective interests targeted by the
statutes are not necessarily distinct. Exposing someone to "public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule" at least has the potential to provoke a breach of the peace.
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truth was not a defense in a criminal libel prosecution, but at least
some of the state criminal libel statutes recognize truth as a de-
fense. 204 And while civil libel requires that the defamatory material
have been communicated to someone other than the victim, crimi-
nal libel only requires that it have been communicated to "a person
other than the publisher of the" material.2 "5 The premise that pub-
lication to the victim suffices for criminal libel apparently derives
from the historical concern with preventing breaches of the
206peace.
There is no federal criminal defamation provision.
2.Use Against Cyberbullying
Since criminal defamation does not require that the defama-
tory material have been communicated directly to the victim, we do
not need to incorporate the distinction between direct and indirect
cyberbullying into this analysis. Unlike stalking, harassment, and
threats, criminal defamation can, but does not necessarily, involve
inflicting harm by directly targeting the victim. As we saw in the
previous section, its concern is the more or less generalized com-
munication of material that can provoke a breach of the peace and
204. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004(b) ("It shall be a defense to a
charge of criminal defamation if it is found that such matter was true."); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:443 (2005) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765(3)(1)
(same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-57 (West 2005) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
168 (2005) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01(2)(a) (same); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 774 (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6560 (1974) (same); see
also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 8 (LexisNexis 2002) (stating that truth is a
defense "unless actual malice is proved").
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01(3)(c). See Online Defamation, supra
note 173, at 709-10. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977)
(stating that defamatory material must be published "to one other than the
person defamed").
206. See Online Defamation, supra note 173, at 710. See also 50 AM. JUR.
2d, Libel and Slander § 507 (2006) (stating that some criminal defamation
statutes are specifically intended to prevent breach of the peace). But see
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004(a) (making no reference to breaches of the
peace); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765 (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(2)
(same).
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expose the person it concerns to "public hatred, contempt, or ridi-
cule.
2 07
Logically, a cyberbully could be prosecuted for criminal
defamation if he or she (i) published information to one or more
persons' °8 (ii) that was false and (iii) had the capacity to provoke a
breach of the peace or expose the person it concerned to public ha-
tred, contempt, or ridicule. Since our definition of cyberbullying
assumes that a bully uses modern communications technology to
disseminate information about his or her victim, the first require-
ment should by definition be met in any cyberbullying case. The
second and third requirements are similarly unproblematic; the
prosecution will have to prove that the information disseminated by
the bully was false and that it had the potential for inflicting the
requisite harm(s) on the victim.
The issue that might be problematic is whether the cyber-
bully acted with "actual malice," as required by New York Times v.
210Sullivan2 °9 and Garrison v. Louisiana. In Sullivan, the Supreme
Court held that civil liability could not be imposed for defamatory
statements about a public official unless the statements were false
and made with "actual malice., 21' The Sullivan Court defined ac-
tual malice as making a statement "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.",2 12 The
Garrison Court applied the Sullivan rule to prosecutions for libel
and noted that truth is a defense in a libel case.21 Both cases in-
volved the publication of comments that concerned a public official
214or matters of public concern.
207. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-105(1), supra note 203 and ac-
companying text.
208. As we saw in the previous section, in most jurisdictions this includes
publishing the material to the victim. For this analysis, it is irrelevant whether
a bully communicates the defamatory material directly to the victim or targets
the victim indirectly by communicating it to others.
209. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
210. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
211. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
212. Id.
213. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 71-74.
214. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58 (stating that the newspaper pub-
lished comments concerning Sullivan's actions as a City Commissioner); Gar-
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The Sullivan and Garrison holdings were at issue in I.M.L.
v. State,215 a libel prosecution of a student who posted derogatory
comments about the principal and faculty of his high school on a
website. Among other things, it described the principal as a "'town
drunk' and accused him of sleeping with the secretary of the high
school." 216 Other posts accused one teacher of being a homosexual
211and another of being a drug addict. I.M.L. moved to dismiss the
charges, arguing that Utah's criminal libel statute was unconstitu-
tional because it did not require "actual malice" and did not recog-
218nize truth as a defense. The Utah Supreme Court agreed; it held
the statute unconstitutional and reversed the trial court's denial of
219I.M.L's motion to dismiss the charges.
The I.M.L. court seems to have assumed the principal and
teachers constituted public figures under the Sullivan and Garrison
holdings. 220 As an Indiana court noted, state courts have disagreed
on whether a principal is a public figure for the purposes of requir-
221ing actual malice in a defamation case. Courts have also dis-
rison, 379 U.S. at 64-66 (recording that a district attorney criticized the local
judiciary).
215. 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002).
216. Id. at 1040.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1041.
219. See id. at 1047-48.
220. It might, instead, have assumed that the topics I.M.L. addressed in
his postings were matters of public concern. See supra note 214 and accompa-
nying text. The discussion above is based on the premise that the court as-
sumed they were public figures because this is the approach many courts have
taken in resolving the actual malice issue. See, e.g., Beeching v. Levee, 764
N.E.2d 669, 677 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases).
221. See Beeching, 764 N.E.2d at 677 n.5. Compare State v. Defley, 395
So. 2d 759, 761 (La. 1981) (holding that school superintendent and school su-
pervisor are public officials), and Kapiloff v. Dunn, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1975) (holding that a principal is a public figure), with Ellerbee v.
Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. 1992) (holding high school principal not a pub-
lic official), and McCutcheon v. Moran, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (same).
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agreed on whether a teacher is a public figure under this stan-
dard.222
While the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue,
lower courts have held that "it is inappropriate to require that de-
famatory false statements must be made with 'actual malice' ...
[when] one private person disseminates defamatory statements
about another private individual in the victim's community.,
223
These courts have noted that the actual malice standard is not
limited to defamation actions brought by public
officials and public figures. The Supreme
Court has also required that a private person-
that is, one who is neither a public official nor a
public figure-must . . . prove actual malice to
recover presumed or punitive damages for
defamation. Although the Supreme Court in
Gertz ... rejected the view that a private per-
son must prove actual malice to recover com-
pensatory damages for false defamatory state-
ments concerning an issue of public.., interest,
the Court held that actual malice must be
proved ... to recover presumed or punitive
damages. The Gertz opinion may be read as
stating that actual malice must be proved to re-
cover presumed or punitive damages ...but
Dun & Bradstreet ... clarified that the actual-
malice requirement applies only when the
222. See, e.g., Visentin v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Dist., 782 N.Y.S.2d 517, 518
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (stating that a teacher is not a public figure); Beler v. Mil-
ford Bd. of Educ., No. CV054002886S, 2005 WL 2008428 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 23, 2005) (stating that the public school teacher was a public figure). In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court said that someone is a public
figure when he "achieve[s] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a
public figure for all purposes and in all contexts" or "voluntarily injects him-
self or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a
public figure for a limited range of issues." 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
223. People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. 1991).
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defamation of the private person involves a
matter of public concern.224
Courts have also found that not requiring actual malice in
cases involving private persons and matters that are not of public
concern is permissible because "speech on matters of purely private
concern is of less First Amendment concern.
2 25
A federal court therefore held that Colorado's criminal libel
statute could "be applied ... to private defamers who 'knowingly
publish or disseminate ... any statement or object tending ... to
impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation of a private in-
dividual,' even when no showing of actual malice is made., 226 If
that interpretation of the First Amendment is correct, it means that
a cyberbully who publishes material defaming a private person (a
student or teacher for the purposes of this analysis) can be charged
with, and convicted of, criminal defamation as long as he or she
published false material that actually inflicted or had the capacity to
inflict the harm prohibited by the libel statute at issue. That would
open up the possibility of using criminal liability against at least
some cyberbullies.227
A cyberbully might still be able to avoid criminal liability.
As one court noted, "[t]he First Amendment also protects ostensi-
bly libelous statements when such statements amount to 'no more
than rhetorical hyperbole,' or. . . amount to opinion, satire, or par-
ody that could not reasonably be interpreted as making a factual
statement." 28 While the Supreme Court has applied this exception
224. State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139, 142-43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749,
751,761 (1985)).
225. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759. See also Mink v. Knox, 566 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 2008).
226. Mink, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (quoting Colorado v. Ryan, 806 P.2d
935, 939 (Colo. 1991)).
227. A cyberbully could still avoid conviction if he or she proved that the
material published was true.
228. Mink, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g.
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)). See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to "find that a state's interest in pro-
tecting public figures ... is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to
speech that is patently offensive ... even when that speech could not reasona-
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to defamation cases involving public figures, it has not ruled on
whether it also applies to cases involving purely private figures. 229
Some lower courts have assumed that it does apply in this con-
text.230
The Supreme Court may not have felt it necessary to rule
on this issue because, until recently, private persons were unlikely
to be the targets of hyperbole, satire, or parodies. Prior to the
Internet, the only outlets in which such material could be published
were those operated by the mainstream media, such as newspapers,
magazines, and television and radio stations. As we saw earlier,
certain factors (such as cost and the possibility of being sued) act as
de facto filters which limit the content that is published by main-
stream media outlets; since the audience for parody or satire involv-
ing a "regular person" is likely to be very small, mainstream media
outlets have no incentive to publish such material. They tend to fo-
cus their efforts on public figures because stories about public fig-
ures are more likely to generate a large audience.
As we also saw earlier, cyberspace changes all that and es-
sentially makes each of us a public figure, or more accurately, a po-
tentially public figure. But unlike traditional public figures, we do
not inject ourselves into the public domain and do not intentionally
seek celebrity status. Should that make a difference?
The rationale for extending First Amendment protection to
hyperbole, satire, and parody directed at public figures is that their
bly have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure in-
volved"); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974) (holding that
statements made in union newsletter were "merely rhetorical hyperbole," and
that "permitting state libel judgments ... would be plainly inconsistent with
the union's justifiable reliance on the protection of federal law").
229. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access:
A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 757 n.371 (2000) (Re-
sponding to a Justice's question during oral argument in the Hustler Magazine
case, Flynt's lawyer said the exception should apply regardless of whether the
case involves public or private figures. The Court did not address this issue in
its opinion.). See also Walko v. Kean Coll. of N.J., 561 A.2d 680, 685 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (reiterating that the holding in the Hustler Magazine
case is "explicitly applicable to a 'public figure"').
230. See Imperial Apparel, Ltd. v. Cosmo's Designer Direct, Inc., 882
N.E.2d 1011, 1023 (I11. 2008).
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statuses make them foci of legitimate interest among the general
population. Therefore, they are legitimate targets for public discus-
sion, opinion, and parody. None of that is true for private figures
who become the foci of parody, satire, or hyperbole posted on a
website or circulated by e-mail or text messages. They have not
sought out public attention, and they are almost certainly not of in-
terest to the general population of the United States. This suggests
that they should not be treated the same as the celebrities who have
either pursued notoriety or assumed it as an inevitable component
of their public positions.
But while these Internet public figures-the "lower-case"
public figures-have not sought to become a focus of public com-
mentary and discussion, they have acquired that status, just as any
of us will if someone is inclined to feature us on their blog or other
online communication. These "lower-case" public figures are, in
effect, de facto public figures or, perhaps, quasi-public figures.
Their character, activities, and predilections may not be of concern
to the general public, but they presumably are of some concern to a
subset of the general public. When a student creates a MySpace
page and uses it to criticize her teacher or parody her appearance or
mannerisms, that material will probably be of interest (and amuse-
ment) to her peers. And it may serve a useful purpose: it is, in ef-
fect, published gossip about one who is of interest to a small subset
of the general public. As we saw earlier, gossip can serve useful
purposes as long as it does not disintegrate or devolve into com-
ments that could reasonably be interpreted as fact.23'
We are confronted again with the task of deciding whether
published gossip about those who are not traditional public figures,
but who at least arguably constitute quasi-public figures, inflicts
harms serious enough to require the use of criminal liability to dis-
courage publication of such material. If the gossip is true, there can
be no liability for defamation; if it is not true, there can be no liabil-
ity if the gossip qualifies as hyperbole, parody, or satire, or if we
apply the exception governing such material to quasi-public figures.
For the sake of analysis, we will assume that exception applies to
231. Cf supra note 173 and accompanying text (defining and discussing
gossip).
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the new class of quasi-public figures created by the Internet. It
seems, then, that if someone knowingly publishes false and defama-
tory material about a private citizen (which, by definition, does not
fall within this exception), he or she can be prosecuted for and con-
victed of criminal libel.
Assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the last statement is
correct, we need to decide whether the imposition of such liability is
appropriate in the educational context. More precisely, we need to
decide whether criminal liability should be used to control cyber-
bullying by minor students (since we are assuming that the imposi-
tion of criminal liability against adult teachers and students is per-
missible). We take up that issue in Part III.
C. Invasion of Privacy
Under current law, criminal invasion of privacy cannot be
used to deter cyberbullying in the United States. Only a few states
have an invasion of privacy offense, and those target the infliction
of a very narrow "harm": photographing "another person's intimate
parts... without that person's consent.""'
232. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-801(1) (West 2008). A few other
states have provisions nearly identical to the Colorado statute. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1111 (Lex-
isNexis 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 511 (2006). Iowa defines inva-
sion of privacy as viewing, photographing, or filming someone without his or
her consent while he or she is in a state of full or partial nudity. See IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.21 (West 2003). Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have similar provisions.
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (2004); IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (LexisNexis
2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.21(1) (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
531.090 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539j (West 2004);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.253 (West 1999);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9 (LexisNexis 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
163.700 (West 2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7507.1 (2000); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-64-2 (Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2605 (Supp. 2008);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.115 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28
(LexisNexis 2005); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 942.08 (West 2005). Other states have
similar provisions that criminalize "voyeurism." See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-16-102 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-189a (West 2007); FLA.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes a civil cause
of action for giving "publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another." 233 To be actionable, the material publicized must be
(i) "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and (ii) "not of legiti-
mate concern to the public., 23 4 Unlike civil and criminal defama-
tion, which require only that the defamatory material have been
communicated to someone other than the person being defamed,
this provision requires that the material have been given "public-
ity." The Restatement says that "publicity" means "the matter is
made public, by communicating it to the public at large," or to so
many people it is "substantially certain to become ... public knowl-
STAT. ANN. § 810.14 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:283 and 14:283.1
(2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-304 (2009).
Most of the state statutes criminalizing "invasions of privacy"-however
defined-are voyeurism provisions. That is, they criminalize the act of "spying
on" another, usually for the purpose of gaining "sexual pleasure." See, e.g.,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1246 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "Peeping Tom").
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1714 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "Voyeur").
The remaining statutes, like the Model Penal Code provision, derive from the
common law crime of eavesdropping, which targeted the "harm" of violating
the privacy of someone's home. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *168 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publishing 2001)
(1769). See also The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1896 (1981) (explaining that loss of privacy offenses, such
as being a Peeping Tom and eavesdropping, derive from common law tres-
pass).
As we will see, these statutes really do not apply to the conduct that con-
stitutes cyberbullying. Voyeurism and eavesdropping statutes criminalize the
act of intruding on someone's privacy without being authorized to do so; they
do not encompass disseminating information one has obtained about another
either by violating his or her privacy or by using authorized means to acquire
the information. A few states make it a crime to "publish" images obtained in
violation of a voyeurism statute, but these provisions do not apply unless the
image was obtained without the "victim's" permission. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-6609 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.100 (West 2008); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-64-2 (Supp. 2008). This crime, therefore, is also predicated on the
act of violating someone's privacy, not on the act of publishing consensually-
obtained information about someone.
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
234. Id. For what is "highly offensive," see § 652D cmt. c. For what is
not a "matter of legitimate public concern," see § 652D cmt. d.
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edge." '235 We will not analyze the utility of employing this option
against cyberbullies for two reasons: one is that our exclusive focus
is criminal law; the other is that civil liability is usually not a viable
option in dealing with the online publication of harmful material
because the defendants tend to be judgment-proof. 236
If we thought it advisable, we could create a criminal ana-
logue of the tort of publicizing matters concerning someone's pri-
vate life. Such a step does not, however, seem advisable. It is
unlikely that such an offense would be effective in combating cy-
berbullying because it would reach only the publication of facts not
237known to others. A 2007 study of cyberbullying among teens
found that it most often involved the following: forwarding an e-
mail, IM, or text message from the victim; spreading rumors about
the victim; sending a threatening or "aggressive" e-mail, IM, or text
238message; or posting an embarrassing picture of the victim online.
Neither of the first two would qualify as giving publicity to a
matter concerning the victim's private life under a criminal ana-
logue of the tort. E-mails or other communications sent to some-
one are not "private"; one assumes the risk that the recipient will
share the communication with others. 239 Threats are not private
(and if they were, the privacy would belong to the party sending the
threatening communication, not to the recipient). 240 Finally, post-
ing an embarrassing photo of someone would not qualify under the
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
236. Online Defamation, supra note 173, at 739-48.
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
238. See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECT, CYBERBULLYING AND ONLINE TEENS 1 (June 27, 2007),
http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2007/PIP Cyberbullying
Memo.pdf.pdf.
239. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). See
also, e.g., S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 91-92 (Ala. 2006) (finding no
invasion of privacy where female students voluntarily e-mailed lewd photo-
graphs of themselves to male student and male student did not disseminate
them to anyone else); Campbell v. Woodard Photo., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 857,
862 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (holding employer not liable for invasion of privacy
where officer confiscated employee's personal items while escorting employee
off of employer's premises after termination).
240. See infra Part II.D.
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criminal offense we are postulating unless the photograph was
taken without the victim's permission and at a time or in a context
241in which he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Since
that does not seem to be the case with photos used in cyberbullying,
there is no reason to create a criminal invasion of privacy crime, at
least not for this purpose.
There is no federal criminal analogue of the Restatement of
Torts's cause of action for giving publicity to the private life of an-
other. Like most, if not all, states, the federal system makes it a
crime affirmatively to violate someone's privacy by, say, intercept-
ing his telephone calls, but does not make the dissemination of in-
242formation about another's private life a crime .
D. Threats
A "threat" is similar to a promise: When A threatens B, he
articulates an intention to do something harmful to B or to some-
243one or something B cares about. Threats were not a crime at
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977); see
also Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 442-45 (Cal. 1953) (finding that
where husband and wife did not consent to the publication of a photograph of
them in an affectionate, but not obscene, posture, publication was not an inva-
sion of privacy).
242. See 18 U.S.C § 2511(1) (2006). The Model Penal Code includes a
similar provision. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (1961). The first section
of Section 250.12 criminalizes eavesdropping or visual surveillance "in a 'pri-
vate place."' See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12(1). The eavesdropping or
surveillance can be accomplished in person or by electronic means. See id.
Ohio, South Carolina, and Utah have codified versions of this provision. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470
(2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402 (2008). The second section of Section
250.12 makes it a misdemeanor to intercept or disclose the contents of a pri-
vate message. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12(1). Washington has codified
this provision, while North Carolina adopted a version making it a crime to
"violate the privacy" of telegrams. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.010,
.020 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-371 (West 2007).
243. See; e.g., Glenn R. Butterton, Signals, Threats, and Deterrence: Alive
and Well in the Taiwan Strait, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 78 (1997) (stating that a
threat is a promise to do something bad to someone in the future).
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common law,244 but the common law victim of threats was not en-
tirely without recourse. He or she could "bring the threatener be-
fore a magistrate for the purpose of requiring him to post bond not
to breach the peace by committing the offense threatened.
2 45
1.The Crime
The criminalization of threats is traceable to the Model Pe-
nal Code. In Section 211.3 of the Code, the drafters criminalized
threatening "to commit any crime of violence with purpose to ter-
rorize another or to cause evacuation of a building ... or otherwise
to cause serious public inconvenience. 24 6 The commentary for the
section says it was intended to prevent "serious alarm for personal
safety., 247 This and other portions of the commentary for Section
211.3 indicate that the criminalization of threats was intended to
encompass the infliction of emotional distress.248 The Supreme
Court seems to have adopted this interpretation of "threat" crimes
in Virginia v. Black.249  In Black, the Court explained that the
"speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence' and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition
to protecting people 'from the possibility that the threatened vio-
lence will occur.'
' 250
244. See Postell v. United States, 282 A.2d 551, 553 (D.C. 1971) ("The
crime of oral threats to do bodily harm was unknown to the common law.");
see also People v. Toledo, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 640, 654 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing the
elements of a terroristic threat); United States v. Metzdorf, 252 F. 933, 937 (D.
Mont. 1918) (disapproved by United States v. Smith, 670 F.2d 921 (10th Cir.
1982)).
245. State v. Hamre, 429 P.2d 804, 806 (1967).
246. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
247. Id. § 211.3 cmt.
248. See id. ("Even where the actor has no intention of actually carrying
out his threat, it occasions certain identifiable harms that are appropriate for
redress by the penal law.").
249. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
250. Id. at 359-60 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)).
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Some say threat crimes are purely inchoate offenses, on the
premise that the threat is a preliminary step in the consummation of
211an act of violence. Under this view, criminalization of threats is
functionally analogous to the criminalization of attempts, conspir-
acy, and solicitation; the purpose is to let the law intervene before
212the person who is preparing to commit a crime can actually do so.
Those who subscribe to this interpretation of threat crimes argue
that it is also supported by the restrictions the First Amendment
imposes on criminalizing speech. The theory is that (i) since only
"true threats" can constitutionally be criminalized and (ii) since
"true threats" require that the speaker demonstrate an "unequivo-
cal, unconditional" intent "to inflict injury," (iii) a "true threat" can
be criminalized without violating the First Amendment because it is
a step toward the consummation of a proscribed act.253
251. See, e.g., Peter Alldridge, The Moral Limits of the Crime of Money
Laundering, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 288-89 (2001) ("There is now a large
group of statutory inchoate offenses .... In consequence of these statutes,
criminal law now enjoins conduct that is significantly earlier in time, and fur-
ther removed causally from the consummated offense[.]"); Robert Kurman
Kelner, Note, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the First
Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287, 311-12 (1998) ("Like laws against such in-
choate crimes as conspiracy and attempt, laws against threats arguably serve
to nip potential violence in the bud."); see also United States v. Kelner, 534
F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1976) The court stated:
[R]equirement of a proof of a "true threat" ... works ul-
timately to much the same purpose and effect as would a
requirement of proof of specific intent to execute the
threat because both requirements focus on threats which
are so unambiguous and have such immediacy that they
convincingly express an intention of being carried out.
Id.
252. See Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones & Harold L. Korn,
The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571,
571-72 (1961).
253. See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027.
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Like others, we do not see these positions as irreconcil-
able. 54 We will therefore analyze the viability of using threat
crimes as construed under either approach to control cyberbullying.
As to the threat crimes themselves, many states follow the
Model Penal Code by criminalizing "terroristic threats., 255 Others
254. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and
the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 1061-
62 (2002) ("To the degree that the jurisprudence of 'true threats' is focused
not only on fear or disruption but also on the prevention of threatened con-
duct that might endanger life (or... other protected interests), its focus is mis-
takenly shifted.., to that of an inchoate offense."); see also People v. Pardew,
No. D043413, 2004 WL 3017286, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (holding
that a threat communicated to an unintended victim that causes fear in the vic-
tim has still committed the crime of criminal threat) (negative appellate treat-
ment).
255. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-15 (2005) (criminalizing terrorizing
another individual, disrupting school activities, or causing the evacuation of a
building or place of assembly); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.807 (2008) (similar pro-
vision but requires the threat-maker to use some type of chemical weapon);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-301 (2006) (defining terroristic threat as threatening
death or serious injury to another person and in particular a teacher or school
employee in the line of duty); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 621 (2007) (criminal-
izing traditional threats as well as those causing the evacuation of buildings
and public places); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37 (2007) (similar provision but
also criminalizing threats to release hazardous chemicals); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 707-716 (LexisNexis 1993) (specifically adding threats against educa-
tional workers to definition of terroristic threats); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29D-
20 (2003) (providing a detailed definition of "terroristic threat" to include
threats to computer networks, livestock, food and water supplies, and public
buildings); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.080 (West 2008) (terroristic threats are
those that threaten an individual or cause evacuation of a building); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.713 (West 2009) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 574.115 (West
2003) (similar provision but requires the lives of at least ten people to be
threatened); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.01 (2008) (criminalizing threats made
to an individual's life or which cause evacuation of a building); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:12-3 (West 2005) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.20 (McKinney
2008) (defining terroristic threats as those which intend to intimidate a popula-
tion or coerce the government); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2706 (2000) (terroristic
threats are those that threaten an individual's life or cause evacuation); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-8-13 (2004) (similar to the New York statute); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 (Vernon 2003) (similar to the New York and Illi-
nois statutes); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1202 (2001) (traditional
threat statute that also criminalizes threats which cause evacuation or public
reach essentially the same result by creating the crime of "threaten-
ing. '256 Connecticut's general "threatening" statute is a good ex-
ample of a statute that falls into the latter category:
A person is guilty of threatening ... when: (1)
By physical threat, such person intentionally
places or attempts to place another ... in fear
of imminent serious physical injury, (2) such
person threatens to commit any crime of vio-
lence with the intent to terrorize another per-
son, or (3) such person threatens to commit
such crime of violence in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such terror. 57
Pennsylvania's general threat statute is similar, but adds the
Model Penal Code elements of causing the evacuation of a building
(or other "public inconvenience"):
A person commits the crime of terroristic
threats if the person communicates, either di-
rectly or indirectly, a threat to:
(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to
terrorize another;
inconvenience); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-62 (West 2007) (traditional
threat statute criminalizing "terrorizing" another); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 209 (2006) (criminal threats are those which cause victim to fear death
or serious bodily injury); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 14(b) (West 2009)
(criminalizing threats involving chemical weapons, hijacking, and disruption of
school); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:4a (LexisNexis 2007) (criminalizing
threats to certain government officials); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1172(A)(2) (West 2002) (dealing with threats made via electronic communica-
tions); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60(A)(1) (2009) (traditional threat statute speci-
fying threats made on school property or directed toward it). Several states
seem to have revised their "terroristic threat" statutes in the wake of the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, so that they now encompass threats by terrorists
as such. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.23 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-23-750 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107 (2008).
256. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1202 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-62 (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 209 (2006); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:4 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1172(A)(2) (West
2002).
257. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-62(a) (West 2007).
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(2) cause evacuation of a building, place of as-
sembly or facility of public transportation; or
(3) otherwise cause serious public inconven-
ience, or cause terror or serious public incon-
venience with reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such terror or inconvenience z. s
While the Pennsylvania statute tracks the language of the
Model Penal Code's provision, it updates the crime by defining
''communicates" as "conveys in person or by written or electronic
means, including telephone, electronic mail, Internet, facsimile,
telex, and similar transmissions., 259 A few other states achieve the
same result by different means.260
Some state statutes address (at least in part) threats directed
at schools or teachers. Arkansas's "terroristic threatening" statute,
for example, makes it a crime if someone, acting "[w]ith the pur-
pose of terrorizing another person, . . .cause[s] physical injury or
property damage to a teacher or other school employee acting in
the line of duty., 261 This statute does not define school, but a com-
panion provision-which makes it a crime to threaten a school em-
ployee or student with death-defines school as an "elementary
school, junior high school or high school; technical institute or post-
258. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2706(a) (2000).
259. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2706(e) (2000).
260. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1172(A)(2) (West 2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-60(A)(1) (2009).
261. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(B) (2006). See also MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 269, § 14(c) (LexisNexis 2009) (criminalizing threats that lead to se-
rious disruptions of schools, school related events, and school transportation).
The Arkansas statute also makes it a crime to threaten someone with "death
or serious physical injury or substantial property damage." See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) (2006). California makes it a crime to threaten "any
officer or employee of any public or private educational institution" with
"unlawful injury" in order to coerce him or her "to do, or refrain from doing,
any act" in the performance of their duties. CAL. PENAL CODE § 71 (West
1999). South Carolina makes it a crime to threaten to "take the life of or in-
flict bodily harm upon" an elementary or secondary school teacher or princi-
pal or a member of his or her immediate family "if the threat is directly related
to the... teacher's... or principal's professional responsibilities." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-1040(A) (2003).
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secondary vocational-technical school; or [t]wo-year or four-year
college or university." 
262
Idaho takes a different approach to school threats. It makes
it a crime for "[a]ny person, including a student, [to] willfully
threaten[ ] on school grounds by word or act to use a firearm or
other deadly or dangerous weapon to do violence to any other per-
son on school grounds., 263 The statute defines "school grounds" as
being "in, or on the property of, a public or private elementary or
secondary school. 24
Virginia has a similar statute penalizing the communication
of
a threat, in a writing, including an electronically
transmitted communication .. , to kill or do
bodily harm, (i) on the grounds or premises of
any elementary, middle or secondary school
property, (ii) at any elementary, middle or sec-
ondary school-sponsored event or (iii) on a
school bus . . . and the threat would place the
person who is the object of the threat in rea-
sonable apprehension of death or bodily
harm.265
A separate provision makes it a much less serious crime to
threaten to "kill or to do bodily injury" to "any employee of any
elementary, middle or secondary school, while on a school bus, on
school property or at a school-sponsored activity.,
266
262. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-17-101(d) (2006). See also TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-114(a) (Supp. 2008) (defining school in a similar way). For the Arkan-
sas death threat offense, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-17-101(a) (2006). Tennes-
see makes it a crime to threaten a school employee with death. See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-114(b) (Supp. 2008).
263. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-33021(1)(a) (Supp. 2009). The prosecution
does not have to prove that the person "actually intended to carry out the
threat." See id. § 18-33021(1)(b).
264. Id. § 18-33021(2)(c).
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60(A)(2) (2009). One who communicates
such a threat commits the crime "regardless of whether the person who is the
object of the threat actually receives the threat." Id.
266. Id. § 18.2-60(B). The oral threat crime is a misdemeanor. See id.
The written threat crime is a Class 6 felony. Id. § 18.2-60(A)(2).
2009]
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Kentucky's "terroristic threatening in the first degree" stat-
ute also focuses on conduct that targets school property, but takes a
different approach to threatening. The statute makes it a crime for
someone to
[i]ntentionally make[ ] false statements that he
or she or another . . . has placed a weapon of
mass destruction on: (1) The real property or
any building of any . . . elementary or secon-
dary school, vocational school, or institution of
post-secondary education; (2) [a] school bus or
other vehicle . . . [owned or used by a school];
(3) The real property or any building.., that is
the site of an official school-sanctioned func-
tion.1
61
Kentucky's "terroristic threatening in the second degree"
statute makes it a crime to "threaten[ ] to commit any act likely to
result in death or serious physical injury to" a student, teacher, or
other school employee or anyone "reasonably expected to lawfully
be on school property or at a school-sanctioned activity, if the
threat is related to their employment by a school,... attendance at
school, or a school function.,
268
Federal law includes a general threat crime of much nar-
rower focus than the Model Penal Code's terroristic threat provi-
sion or any of the statutes described above. The federal statute
makes it a crime to transmit "in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another." 26' The statute has been in-terpreted as encompassing threats sent by electronic means, such as
267. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.075(1)(a)(1)-(3) (2008). Washington
makes it a crime "to threaten to bomb or otherwise injure any public or pri-
vate school building." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.160(1) (West Supp.
2009). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-14A-24 (2006) (penalizing the use of
a substance or device to communicate a threat that causes inconvenience or
disruption of school or school related event).
268. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.078(1)(a) (2008).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
e-mail.27 ° There is no school- or teacher-specific federal threat
crime.
2.Use Against Cyberbullying
In analyzing the use of threat statutes against cyberbullies,
we need to consider direct and indirect cyberbullying separately.
The definitions of the two types of cyberbullying are the same as
the definitions we used earlier.
2 71
a. Direct Cyberbullying
This alternative is the most likely to be susceptible to prose-
cution under threat statutes because it preserves the essential threat
dynamic. As noted earlier, a threat is analogous to a promise; that
is, it is a statement of an intention to do (or not to do) something
that one person makes to another. Threats need not be explicit;
they can be inferred from conduct, but the conduct must still be di-
rected at the prospective victim.
E-mail and instant (or text) messaging are the cyber-
vehicles primarily used to transmit threats in direct cyberbullying,
though social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook have
also been used for this purpose. 27' The medium is irrelevant,
though: as long as the alleged threat was sent directly to the pro-
spective victim, it satisfies the threshold requirement for a threat. If
the other requirements (the sender says he or she intends to harm
270. See, e.g., Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2200 (2008) (re-
viewing defendant's sentence after defendant pleaded guilty to violating stat-
ute when he sent e-mail threatening to kill his ex-wife and her new husband);
United States v. Poirier, 52 F. App'x 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing denial
of defendant's request to withdraw guilty plea with regard to defendant's
transmission of an e-mail threatening to kill employees of company).
271. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a-b.
272. See, e.g., High School Student Arrested for Threatening Classmates
on MySpace, CHARLOTrESVILLE NEWSPLEX, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.charlottesvillenewsplex.tv/home/headlines/32363969.html ("Police
said the 17-year-old male student sent death threats to two female classmates
on the social networking site .... ").
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the victim or someone or something he or she cares about) are met,
the message is a threat."'
A single message is enough to warrant prosecution. Stalk-
ing and harassment statutes require repeated hostile or unsettling
communications for the commission of either offense, because both
offenses are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with the inflic-
274tion of emotional distress. For someone to be convicted of violat-
ing non-credible-threat stalking and harassment statutes, it is not
necessary that the cyberbully have communicated an intention to
cause physical harm or even the death of the victim. 275 The inflic-
tion of emotional harm resulting from his or her conduct is the
276gravamen of both crimes. As we saw above, the perpetrator's
persistence in targeting the victim is the device used to distinguish
the casual, non-criminal infliction of emotional distress from the
dedicated, malicious infliction of distress criminalized by stalking
and harassment statutes.
273. See, e.g., Barmore v. Aidala, 419 F. Supp. 2d 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)
(white high-school students sent "various life threatening emails and/or instant
messages" to black student), complaint dismissed, No. 04-CV-0445, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 46940 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2006); see also United States v. Knatz,
No. 06-14066-CR, 2006 WL 5844814, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2006) (Defendant
sent e-mails to faculty at New York University threatening "to shoot deans,
professors, secretaries, students and others."). See generally Priyanka Dayal,
Cell Phone Use Huge with Students, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE,
Jan. 29, 2009, 2009 WLNR 1959012 (students using text messaging and social
networking sites to send threats to each other).
If e-mail or other online communications threaten the victim with some-
thing other than harm to herself or someone or something she cares about, the
defendant may be charged with additional crimes. See, e.g., Brad Hicks, Child
Porn Trial Set for March 9, TIMES-TRIBUNE (Corbin, Ky.), Jan. 6, 2009, 2009
WLNR 266561 (University student who sent female student e-mails threaten-
ing to "divulge images of her engaged in sexual activity unless she sent him
sexually explicit videos and images of herself" was charged with possessing
child pornography and accessing e-mail accounts of others).
274. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
275. Since credible threat stalking and harassment statutes simply define
threat crimes, we do not analyze them separately. See discussion supra Part
II.A. The analysis that applies to traditional threat crimes will also apply to
these modified threat crimes.
276. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
Threat crimes do not require persistent conduct by the per-
petrator (though this is not uncommon). A single threat suffices for
the imposition of liability because while threat crimes are con-
cerned with emotional distress, they are more concerned with let-
ting law enforcement intervene to prevent the infliction of physical
injury. In this regard, then, the inchoate element of threat crimes
eclipses the emotional distress component of the crime.
b. Indirect Cyberbullying
The use of threat crimes against indirect cyberbullying will
be problematic because indirect cyberbullying distorts-if it does
not eliminate-the essential threat dynamic, i.e., the perpetrator's
directly targeting the victim. The case that best illustrates this is
United States v. Alkhabaz.277
Abraham Jacob Alkhabaz was charged with violating the
federal threat statute making it a crime to transmit a threat to kid-
nap or injure someone via interstate or foreign commerce. 27' Alk-
habaz, then a student at the University of Michigan, had posted
"fictional stories to 'alt.sex.stories' [a Usenet] news group." 279 The
stories described "the abduction, rape, torture, mutilation, and
murder of women"; one of the stories described the "torture, rape,
and murder" of a woman with the same name as one of Alkhabaz's
classmates. 18 An "alarmed citizen" saw the story and notified the
University, which initiated an investigation resulting in Alkhabaz's
being charged with violating the threat statute. 281 The charges were
not based on the story Alkhabaz posted online; they were, instead,
based on e-mails he exchanged with "Arthur Gonda," an
alt.sex.stories fan who corresponded with Alkhabaz about their mu-
tual interest in "violence against women and girls." 282
277. 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
278. Id. at 1493. Defendant was charged with one count under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c); a superseding five count indictment under the same statute was re-
turned the next month. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1498 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 1493 (majority opinion).
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Alkhabaz moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the e-
mails were not "true threats" and were, therefore, protected by the
First Amendment. 18' The district court granted the motion. The
284government appealed, but the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal.
The Sixth Circuit found, in effect, that the e-mails between Alkha-
baz and Gonda did not constitute "true threats" because they were
not sent to the victim. 285 Further, there was no reason to believe
286the victim would see what they wrote. The Sixth Circuit held that
to constitute a "true threat," a communication must (i) be such that
a reasonable person would interpret it as a serious expression of an
intent to inflict bodily harm on the victim and (ii) be communicated
for the purpose of intimidating the victim in order to "effect some
change or achieve some goal." 28 7 The Sixth Circuit found that even
if a reasonable person would interpret the Alkhabaz-Gonda e-mails
as expressing an intention to inflict bodily harm, no reasonable per-
son would perceive them as being intended to intimidate the vic-
tim.288 It concluded that the e-mails were sent "in an attempt to fos-
ter a friendship based on shared sexual fantasies." 
289
Courts have applied this analysis in holding that comments
students posted on websites did not constitute "true threats." In
Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 29a Michigan high school sus-
pended a student after the principal and other staff members saw
comments he posted on a site called "Satan's web page." 291 The
school representatives seem to have been particularly concerned
about two aspects of the site: the list of "'people I wish would die"'
and an entry entitled "SATAN'S MISSION FOR YOU THIS
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1494-95.
286. See id. at 1496 ("If an otherwise threatening communication is not,
from an objective standpoint, transmitted for the purpose of intimidation, then
it is unlikely that the recipient will be intimidated or that the recipient's peace
of mind will be disturbed.").
287. Id. at 1495.
288. Id. at 1496.
289. Id.
290. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
291. Id. at 781.
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WEEK: Stab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw
them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and ... just before everything
goes black, spit on their face." 292 The student was allowed to return
to the school after a disciplinary hearing was held, but chose not to
(he graduated from another school and his parents sued the original
school district). 293
One of their claims was that the school district deprived
their son of his rights under the First Amendment. The school ar-
gued that the statements on the website were "true threats" and
were therefore unprotected by the First Amendment. 194 The dis-
trict court disagreed. It found, first of all, that there was no evi-
dence the student "communicated the statements on the website to
anyone." 295 The court noted that "although other students [at the
high school] did see the website, there is no evidence that they did
so because [the suspended student] 'communicated' the website to
them or intended to do so." 296 The court also found that "a reason-
able person in [the suspended student's] place would not foresee
that the statements on the website would be interpreted as a serious
expression of an intent to harm or kill anyone listed on the web-
site." 27
291Other courts have reached similar conclusions. While
these cases all involved civil suits, a court is likely to reach the same
conclusion in a criminal prosecution, just as the Sixth Circuit did in
Alkhabaz. So far, none of the cases has involved a website on
which the owner or user posts a direct threat to harm someone
(such as "I am going to kill John Doe, who is in my algebra class,
292. Id. at 782.
293. Id. at 783.
294. Id. at 785-86.
295. Id. at 786.
296. Id.
297. Id. (explaining that his "listing of names under the heading 'people I
wish would die,' did not constitute a threat to the people listed therein any-
more than [his] listing of names under the heading 'people that are cool,'
make those listed therein 'cool"').
298. See, e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 859 (Pa.
2002) (finding a student's website which explained reasons why a teacher at
the school should die was crude and offensive, but not a "serious expression of
intent to inflict harm"). See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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because I hate him"). If and when such a case arises, courts will
have to decide if the post constitutes a "true threat" under the Alk-
habaz analysis.
Such a posting could be read as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm on the victim, but this probably
would not be enough to support a prosecution for threats. If the
message is simply posted on a site and there is no reason to believe
the ostensible victim will see it, the prosecution would not be able
to prove that the poster acted with the purpose of intimidating the
victim in order to achieve some goal or effect some change. In
other words, the second element-the impact on the victim-would
be missing.
Would this element be established if the poster put the
comment on a website he knew she was likely to see? That would
certainly be a stronger case, but whether it would be enough to
warrant charging the poster with threatening the ostensible victim
would probably depend on other factors, such as the context of the
posting (joke or serious statement?) and the likelihood that the vic-
tim would see it. Another issue that should probably be factored
into this analysis is the age of the poster and the nature of the puta-
tive threat. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did this in J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area School District."' In that case, an eighth-grader
created a website that devoted several pages to his algebra teacher,
Mrs. Fulmer. As Part I explained, the school expelled the student
and his parents sued, claiming his comments on the website were
protected by the First Amendment. After considering various fac-
tors-such as that the statements were not communicated directly
to Mrs. Fulmer-the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
statements did not constitute "true threats" because the site
taken as a whole, was a sophomoric, crude,
highly offensive[,] and perhaps misguided at-
tempt at humor or parody .... [I]t did not re-
flect a serious expression of intent to inflict
harm. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the web site focused primarily on Mrs.
299. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). See discussion supra Part I.A.2
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Fulmer's physique and disposition and utilized
cartoon characters, hand drawings, song, and a
comparison to Adolph Hitler. 'oo
Courts confronting similar issues in the future are likely to
focus on the age of the student (on the premise that older students
are presumably more likely to commit and more capable of actually
committing acts of violence), the nature of the putative threats, and
as noted earlier, the extent to which it is reasonable to conclude
that the poster intended for the victim to learn of the threats. The
persistence with which a poster continues to put threats online
might also be a consideration in this analysis. Overall, though, it is
unlikely courts will uphold threat charges based on material posted
on a publicly-accessible website. It is even more unlikely that they
will uphold threat charges based on a website to which access is re-
stricted.
E. Identity Theft
Cyberbullying can involve what is, in effect, framing the vic-
tim, such as using the victim's identity to portray him or her in a
bad light.3 °1 As the first section below explains, while both state
and federal law criminalize a form of identity theft, it is not really
the kind of identity theft that serves as an empirical predicate for
cyberbullying. The next section analyzes the utility of using identity
theft against cyberbullies.
1.The Crime
Every state has criminalized identity theft. 3°2  Congress
made it a federal crime in 1998.303 The federal statute makes it a
300. J.S., 807 A.2d at 859.
301. See, e.g., A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224-26 (Ind. 2008) (Stu-
dents created a MySpace profile for the principal and posted derogatory
comments on the fake profile.).
302. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IDENTITY
THEFT STATUTES & CRIMINAL PENALTIES, Nov. 12, 2007,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/idt-statutes.htm (listing state statutes
criminalizing identity theft as of 2007). Some states refer to the crime as
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crime to use the "means of identification" of another to commit or
to aid and abet the commission of a federal crime or a felony under
state law.' °4 It defines "means of identification" as "any name or
number that may be used.. . to identify a specific individual. '"3' 5
Most state identity theft statutes make it a crime to assume
another person's identity or use "personal identifying information
"identity fraud" instead of "identity theft." Substantively, there is little, if any,
difference between the crimes. See Samuel H. Johnson, Note, Who We Really
Are: On the Need for the United States to Adopt the European Paradigm for
Identity Fraud Protection, 15 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 123, 123 (2006)
(explaining that the difference between terms is a matter of preference). But
see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4018 (2007) (distinguishing identity theft and iden-
tity fraud). Since our concern is with general prohibitions on using someone
else's identity, we will use the term "identity theft" to denote the crime ad-
dressed by all of these statutes.
303. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028-1028A (2006). See also Joshua R. Levenson,
Note, Strength in Numbers: An Examination into the Liability of Corporate
Entities for Consumer and Employee Data Breaches, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 95, 111 (2008) (discussing Congress's enactment of the "Identity Theft
and Assumption Deterrence Act").
304. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.80(3)
(McKinney 2009) (defining "identity theft in the first degree" as assuming
identity of another and committing or attempting to commit a Class D felony
or higher level crime); cf DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 854 (2007) (defining iden-
tity theft as transmitting another's personal information in order to commit or
facilitate another crime); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-839.6 (2007) (same); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.67 (West 2009) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.527
(West 2009) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.020 (West 2009) (same).
See also United States v. Harrison, No. 04CR369, 2004 WL 2884310, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004) (holding defendant guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §
1028(a)(7) when defendant used other individuals' identifying information to
aid and abet income tax fraud), affd, 175 F. App'x 386 (2nd Cir. 2006). Sec-
tion 1028 criminalizes eight different types of conduct, some of which go to
creating, transferring, or possessing false identification documents, others of
which go to defrauding the U.S. government. Section 1028(a)(7) is the most
generic and therefore most commonly used provision. Id.
305. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). The statute includes someone's name, social
security number, date of birth, driver's license or identification number, alien
registration number, passport number, employer or taxpayer identification
number, biometric data such as fingerprints, voice prints, retina or iris images
"or other unique physical representation," or "unique electronic identification
number, address, or routing code[,] or telecommunication identifying informa-
tion or access device[.]" Id.
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of that other person, 30 6 to "obtain goods, money, property or ser-
vices or ... credit in" that person's name.30 7 Some expansive state
statutes follow the federal approach by also making it a crime to use
another's personal identifying information to commit or to aid and
abet the commission of other crimes.3 8
306. Definitions of "personal identifying information" in state identity
theft statutes essentially track the definition of "means of identification" in the
federal statute. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.285 (West 2004) (ex-
plaining that definitions of "personal identifying information" in state identity
theft essentially track the definition of "means of identification" in the federal
statute); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-129a(b) (West 2007); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 854(c) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-
301(a)(1)(3) (LexisNexis 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-332(3) (2007); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-16-24.1(C)(2) (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.77(1)
(McKinney 1999); OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.49(A) (LexisNexis 2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-150(e) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2030(c)
(2008).
307. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.780(1)-(2) (McKinney 1999). See ALA.
CODE § 13A-8-192(a) (LexisNexis 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-227(a)
(2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-5-902(1) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-129a(a) (West 2007); D.C. CODE § 22-3227.02 (2001); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 708-839.7-.8 (1985); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16G-15 (West
2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715A.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4018(a)
(2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.160 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:67.16(B) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-301 (LexisNexis
2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 37E (LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-9-79 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.223 (West 2009); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-6-332(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:26 (LexisNexis 2007);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-24.1(c) (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.78
(McKinney 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.49 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1533.1 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800 (2007); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-49.1-3 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-510 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-8 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-150 (2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-1102 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.3 (2009);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-901 (2009).
308. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-839.6(1) (1985) (explaining that it is a
crime to use another's identity to facilitate murder, kidnapping, extortion,
criminal property damage, or other crimes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.285(1)(e) (West 2004) (using another's identity to commit identity theft
"or another crime"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4120 (West 1983) (crime to
use another's identity "to further any unlawful purpose"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 2030 (2008) (using another's identity unlawfully is a crime).
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At least two states explicitly make it a crime to use another
person's personal identifying information to "harass another per-
son." 30 9 "Harass" seems to have the same meaning as in the free-
standing harassment statutes examined earlier.310 These provisions
presumably make it a crime for A to use B's personal identifying
information to harass C.
If these provisions were meant to criminalize the act of us-
ing B's identity to harass B, the prohibition should be phrased in
terms of "harassing that person" or "harassing the person whose in-
formation is being used without authorization." It seems more
likely that these statutes are intended to criminalize A's misappro-
priating B's identity and using it to conceal that it is A - not B -
who is harassing C. If that interpretation is correct, these statutes
are simply specialized versions of statutes making it a crime to use
someone else's identity to commit other crimes.
2.Use Against Cyberbullying
If a cyberbully uses someone else's identity for most of the
purposes outlined above, he can be prosecuted for identity theft.
Neither the elements of these crimes nor the harms they encompass
concern bullying; such conduct therefore becomes irrelevant for the
purposes of imposing criminal liability except to the extent that
charges for some other offense can be based on the bullying.
Most of the crimes outlined above assume that the person
whose identity is misused is the primary victim of the crime; they
assume that the identity thief A misappropriates B's identity and
uses it fraudulently to obtain goods or services from C or, in the
more unusual cases, to commit a crime other than fraud. In this
type of identity theft case, B is the primary victim, but there are
also secondary victims, C-the businesses the identity thief de-
309. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-227(b)(2) (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
266, § 37E(b)-(c) (LexisNexis 2002).
310. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 266 § 37E (2008) (defining "harass" as
to "willfully and maliciously engage in an act directed at a ... person.. . which
... seriously alarms or annoys such person... [and] would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress").
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frauded. There is, however, another type of identity theft in which
B may share primary victim status with someone else; as noted
above, a few states make it a crime for A to use B's identity to har-
ass C.311
So if cyberbully A misappropriates B's identity and uses it
to harass C, A could be prosecuted under one of the identity-theft-
for-the-purpose-of-harassment statutes noted above. He might also
be susceptible to prosecution under one of the more general stat-
utes making it a crime to use someone's identity to commit another
crime if the conduct involved in the bullying constituted the com-
mission of a crime within the scope of the statute. If, for example,
cyberbully A used B's identity to threaten someone or extort prop-
erty from her, then A might be susceptible to prosecution for violat-
ing the identity-theft-for-the-purpose-of-committing-specified-
crimes if the specified crimes encompassed the relevant offense.3"2
But while either alternative may be a conceptual possibility, both
seem rather cumbersome ways to approach cyberbullying, espe-
cially in the educational context.
There is another way to approach the cyberbully who uses
someone's identity to harass her or to commit other crimes, but it
involves a charge that is not generally available under current
United States law. Cyberbully A could assume B's identity and use
it to engage in activity online that could seriously damage B's repu-
tation and might result in B being prosecuted for crimes. If cyber-
bully A were to use B's identity to distribute child pornography, B
could face criminal charges unless B could show that someone else
used her identity to distribute the prohibited material. Or, to use a
less extreme example, cyberbully A could use B's identity to make
false, defamatory comments about students or teachers at their
educational institution. Even if this did not result in B's being
prosecuted or sued for defamation, it would no doubt have a pro-
foundly damaging impact on B's reputation and status at the school.
What the cyberbully is really doing in this scenario and simi-
lar scenarios is imposture. Cyberbully A is impersonating B with-
out B's consent and for the purpose of harming B in ways that do
311. See supra note 309.
312. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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not constitute identity theft as currently defined, or any other
crime. The logical response is to charge the cyberbully with crimi-
nal impersonation. The problem is that such impersonation is not a
crime in the United States.313 Only one state makes it a crime to
impersonate someone for the express purpose of damaging his or
314her reputation. The distribution of child pornography scenario
outlined above might be prosecutable under statutes making it a
crime to use someone's identity to commit another crime, but the
other scenario seems quite beyond the reach of the criminal law.
One way to remedy this is for states to adopt statutes making it a
crime for someone to use another person's identity to damage his
reputation; in effect, such a statute would be an identity-theft-for-
the-purpose-of-committing-defamation statute.31s
313. A few states have criminal impersonation statutes, but most of them
are in effect identity theft statutes. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-2006 (Lex-
isNexis 2001) (showing that a few states have criminal impersonation statutes,
but most of them are in effect identity theft statutes); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 907 (2007) (making criminal impersonation a criminal offense);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-608 (2008) (same).
314. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.201(2)(c) (West 2005) (criminalizing the
use of someone's personal identifying information to "harm the reputation" of
that person). In State v. Baron, 754 N.W.2d 175 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute against a
First Amendment challenge. Baron, who forwarded embarrassing e-mails
written by his boss to other persons, claimed the statute violated the First
Amendment because it "criminalize[d] the act of defaming a public official."
Id. at 177. The trial court agreed: It found that "because the person whose
identity Christopher Baron misappropriated was a public official, application
of the identity theft statute violated Baron's First Amendment right to defame
a public official with true information." Id. at 176-77. The Court of Appeals
reversed that decision; it found that the state's identity theft statute "neither
prohibited Baron from disseminating information about Fisher nor prevented
the public from receiving that information. Instead, the statute prohibited
Baron from purporting to be Fisher when he sent the emails." Id. at 179. In
July of 2008, the Wisconsin Supreme Court chose to hear Baron's appeal from
the Court of Appeal's decision. See State v. Baron, 769 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. 2009)
(holding the statute is unconstitutional; the defendant is free to reveal a public
official's bad character, but may not pretend to be the public official).
315. Baron may provide useful guidance on the constitutionality of such
a statute. See generally Baron, 769 N.W.2d 34.
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III. KIDDIE CRIME?
One of the characteristics that differentiate what we are
calling "kiddie crime" from crime proper is the nature and impact
of the harm inflicted by each. Crime is catholic and generic; the
harms it encompasses are not limited to a particular segment of so-
ciety. Thefts victimize rich and poor, individuals and artificial enti-
ties alike. The same is true of most other crimes. Some regulatory
offenses encompass harm that is necessarily limited to a particular
segment of society," 6 but the harms encompassed by traditional
crimes are pervasive and democratic in nature.
Kiddie crime, on the other hand, inflicts harms that are pe-
culiar to a particular context: schools (of whatever type). To the ex-
tent that conduct that would otherwise constitute kiddie crime in-
flicts a generic harm that has been addressed by the criminal law, it
can be prosecuted as a crime."' It is, as we have seen, the residual
harms that constitute kiddie crime.
The issue we, as a society, need to resolve is whether kiddie
crime should be treated as a non-criminal phenomenon or whether
the harms it inflicts should become the focus of new, kiddie crime-
specific criminal statutes. We can create new crimes; the question
in this instance is whether we should create new crimes that en-
compass the residual and consequently so-far unaddressed harms
constituting kiddie crime.
The answer to that question lies in two aspects of kiddie
crime. One is the nature of the harms involved. The other is the
fact that kiddie crime is unique to a specific social context.
Modern criminal law addresses two types of harm: "hard
harms" and "soft harms."31 Hard harms are the bedrock of crimi-
nal law. They involve the infliction of tangible, egregious injuries to
persons or property and, as such, are the oldest and most persistent
harms. The cataloging and proscribing of these harms has been es-
316. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006) (law of securities fraud).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 285-86 (5th Cir.
2001) (explaining that a student was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
by threatening to kill fellow students).
318. See Fantasy Crime, supra note 171.
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sentially constant from the Hammurabi's Code through subsequent
enactments such as the Salic Law, the common law of Blackstone's
era, and the statutes of the present day. 319 Every society either
must outlaw the infliction of a set of core physical harms (such as
murder, assault, and rape) on individuals or descend into a state of
chaos in which the strong exploit the weak. 30 Every society must
also outlaw a collateral set of physical harms (such as adultery, in-
cest, and child abuse) the infliction of which can erode its ability to
maintain internal order. Since property is valued almost as highly
as human life, each society will also outlaw the infliction of a set of
core physical harms to property (such as arson and other types of
damage, theft, and robbery). More evolved societies will also pro-
scribe the infliction of a collateral set of derivative harms (such as
fraud, counterfeiting, vandalism, and forgery).
In modern societies, especially the United States, we see the
extrapolation of many of the core and collateral hard harms into an
almost dizzying array of "crimes" of varying types and degrees of
severity.32 The extrapolation is attributable to two factors. One is
the refinement of penal philosophies, which have moved beyond
the lex talionis (the law of retaliation) and a default reliance on
death as the punishment for criminal conduct; modern penal phi-
losophies and modern criminal law focus on the nuances of the
319. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 505, 512-13 (2001) (showing the consistent condemna-
tion of hard harms throughout different eras). Compare THE AVALON
PROJECT, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI (L.W. King, trans.),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject-menus/hammenu.asp, and THE AVALON
PROJECT, THE SALIC LAW, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/salic.asp, with
BLACKSTONE, supra Note 219, *127-250 (detailing offenses against public jus-
tice, public peace, public trade, public health, individuals, the home, and pri-
vate property), and MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210-251.4 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (detailing crimes against people, property, the family, public ad-
ministration, and public order and decency).
320. See Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace, 10
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 6-45 (2004) (arguing for the criminalization of
harms).
321. See Stuntz, supra note 319, at 513-51. See also Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998
A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE REP. 9-10 n.11.
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harm inflicted and the personal characteristics of the offender in an
attempt to impose a sanction that is idiosyncratic enough to consti-
tute fair, but not unjust, punishment.122 The other factor is the poli-
ticization of crime; the use of the penal sanction has been expanded
broadly, most notably in the area of regulatory offenses.323 While
the criminal law of ages past was concerned primarily, if not exclu-
324sively, with retribution, our criminal law is increasingly intended
to regulate conduct in a variety of areas, most of which have little or
nothing to do with inflicting the core or collateral harms outlined
above.32 This brings us to the other category of "harm."
Unlike hard harms, which involve tangible injury to persons
or property, soft harms are more difficult to define. Essentially,
they involve the infliction of some type of injury to morality affec-
tivity, or a systemic concern with the safety of individuals and the
integrity of property. 32 Except for non-reputational-injury identity
theft, the crimes we examined above are all soft harm crimes that
target injury to affectivity.3 27 Kiddie crime encompasses the resid-
uum of affective harms that have not already been criminalized,
probably for good reason.
Criminalizing the infliction of affective harm is a dicey un-
dertaking. As we saw earlier, in criminalizing the infliction of some
soft harms, legislators worked to include elements that would pre-
322. See Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal
Law, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 811, 817-19 (2002); see also Robert M. A. Johnson, Is
It A Crime?, 21 CRIM. JUST. 1 (2006) (discussing the relevance of expanding
criminal law).
323. See Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 911, 972-75 (2007).
324. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (holding that
the effects of a murder on the victim's family may be used as admissible evi-
dence against the defendant at a capital punishment hearing).
325. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:
From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747
(2005) (discussing the move toward over-regulation in our society); see also
William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1893-94 (2000)
(discussing legislative crime definition).
326. See Fantasy Crime, supra note 171, at 6-12 (explaining soft and hard
harms).
327. See supra Part II.
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vent the statutes from being held void for vagueness and from
predicating criminal liability on the subjective vagaries of potential
victims. 328 While we cannot say that the criminalization of soft
harms has gone as far as it can without violating constitutional prin-
ciples, we believe it is wise to be cautious in expanding the use of
the criminal sanction to deter the infliction of soft harms.
To create new crimes that target the so-far unaddressed soft
harms that constitute kiddie crime, we would have to move much
further into the territory of affective harms. To address the residual
harm that cannot be prosecuted as stalking or harassment, we
would have to predicate liability on a subset of the conduct crimi-
nalized by these statutes. We could therefore make it a (new)
crime to commit a single act that caused the victim to suffer emo-
tional distress; if we wanted to set the liability bar a little higher but
still achieve essentially the same result, we could make it a crime
(another new crime) (i) to engage in a course of conduct that
caused the victim to suffer emotional distress, or (ii) to commit a
single act that caused the victim to suffer substantial emotional dis-
tress. We might, in addition or instead, reduce the level of mens rea
from purpose or intention to knowing or even to reckless conduct.
We could do this with stalking and harassment, and could
probably do something similar with other relevant soft harm crimes
329(such as threats or invasion of privacy). We should not do it be-
cause lowering the bar further for the imposition of criminal liabil-
ity on those who inflict soft harm is a very bad idea, even if we ig-
nore the vagueness and other legal challenges that could be brought
to the scaled-down offenses. It would trivialize the import and sig-
nificance of the criminal law; the parsimonious use of criminal sanc-
tions to discourage the infliction of egregious affective harm is a
necessary step in a world in which soft harms assume a greater im-
portance than in the past.
As we have seen, modern technology lets people hurt each
other in new ways-ways that can have a lasting impact on the vic-
328. See supra Part II.
329. The First Amendment issues that arise with criminal defamation
would probably preclude us from lowering the mens rea and other require-
ments for imposing liability. See supra Part II.B.
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tim.33° The use of criminal liability is appropriate when the harm
inflicted is so severe that it is at least arguably commensurate with
the harms criminal law has always addressed. It is not appropriate
when the severity of the affective harm inflicted does not rise to
that level.
We cannot criminalize every instance in which people hurt
each other's feelings; hurting other people's feelings, intentionally
and inadvertently, is an unpleasant but unavoidable aspect of life.
There are some things that are not, and should not become, crimes.
As the drafters of the Restatement of Torts noted, law cannot take
cognizance of
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough
edges of our society are still in need of a good
deal of filing down, and . . . [we] must . . . be
hardened to ... acts that are definitely incon-
siderate and unkind. There is no occasion for
the law to intervene in every case where some-
one's feelings are hurt. There must still be
freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and
some safety valve must be left through which
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harm-
less steam."'
This is particularly true for cyberbullying because it takes
place in a specific context and involves a more or less immature
population that can be expected to have more rough edges than the
general, primarily adult, population.
We believe kiddie crime is most appropriately addressed
within the context from which it emerges-within the school the
victim and perpetrator(s) attend. Having schools address kiddie
crime is appropriate for several reasons. One, as we have seen, is
330. See, e.g., Lisa Sink & Linda Spice, Man Charged with Defamation:
Disgruntled Fired Employee Accused of Posting Ad with Ex-boss' Name on
Internet, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 7, 2000, at B1 (claiming that
"[p]eople's reputations are sullied in a very new way, and it's very hard for
them to recover from that").
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
20091 "KIDDIE CRIME"
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW
that it is inappropriate to extend criminal liability to the very real
but lesser levels of soft harm kiddie crime inflicts on its victims.
Another reason is that addressing kiddie crime seems to fall within
schools' educational mission; schools are, after all, responsible for
filing down the rough edges of the students who are in their charge.
Finally, educational institutions are also victims of kiddie crime; as
we saw in Part II, schools are concerned about cyberbullying be-
cause it can have a detrimental effect on their ability to carry out
their educational mission.
When the soft harms inflicted by a cyberbully rise to the
level of stalking, harassment, or the other crimes we examined in
this article, the bully can be prosecuted and sanctioned by the
criminal justice system. This is appropriate because the harms the
cyberbully inflicted are of a severity justifying the imposition of
criminal liability; they transcend the context-specific harm involved
in kiddie crime. If the soft harms inflicted by a cyberbully do not
rise to this level, they fall into the residual category of kiddie crime;
since the context-specific harms constituting kiddie crime are the
product of the educational context and impact on that context, they
should be addressed there.
Schools can deal more quickly and easily with "soft" harms
caused by cyberbullying-detentions, suspensions, and expulsions
can be meted out and finalized before a single complaint and an-
swer could be filed. Further, those disciplinary procedures assure
that the students can stay in school and continue the process of "fil-
ing down the edges." As we have explained, most of these cases
stem from students simply "typing before they think" -many of the
cases outlined in Part II involved students with respectable grades
and no previous discipline records. Criminalizing this behavior
would unnecessarily punish students who are still in the throes of
learning about appropriate behavior, online and off.
Additionally, schools can modify their codes of conduct eas-
ily to cover cyberbullying issues, giving themselves jurisdiction over
any issues that may arise. While the schools still need to show a
material disruption under the Tinker332 standard, some argue that a
332. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(explaining that the standard allows a school to interfere with free speech of
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victim being forced to attend school with his cyberbully and then go
home to find more teasing online would be enough of a disruption
for that particular student to rise to this standard.
Finally, if the individual students feel the harms rise to the
level of necessitating some intervention in the legal system, he can
always fall back on the gap-filler tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and take his antagonist to court.
students only when there is substantial interference with the function of the
school).
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